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The majority of Harmful Digital Communications Act (HDCA) prosecutions in 
New Zealand typically involved the misuse of an adult (female) victim’s intimate 
images by a current or former (male) intimate partner--- “retribution-style” image-
based sexual abuse (IBSA). Retribution-style IBSA encompasses abusive 
behaviours such as covert intimate filming or photography, the non-consensual 
storage of a victim’s intimate images, threats to disseminate such images and the 
actual dissemination of a victim’s intimate images. The harms of victimisation 
include significant emotional distress, job loss, and physical and online stalking 
and harassment by internet users who viewed their intimate images. Due to the 
ubiquity and permanence of the internet, retribution-style IBSA victims cannot be 
guaranteed that their intimate images would not resurface in future. This study 
aims to establish an evidence base for retribution-style IBSA. The crime-
commission process of retribution-style IBSA is investigated using crime script 
analysis. The components of IBSA target selection are detailed using the 
components in the CRAVED framework, and barriers to prevention, tactical and 
strategic approaches for IBSA prevention are identified using a thematic analysis 
of 4 semi-structured interviews and 18 court transcripts. Crime intervention points 
and a situational crime prevention (SCP) framework would be devised to assist 
law enforcement and policy makers with IBSA prevention in New Zealand. 
 Keywords: Retribution-style image-based sexual abuse, Harmful Digital 
Communications Act, crime script analysis, CRAVED, thematic analysis, 
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Chapter 1. Introduction 
1.1. Background of Image-Based Sexual Abuse 
 The advancement of digital communications technologies in this 
information age has facilitated and improved human interconnectivity and 
interactions in the professional, social and intimate spheres. Unfortunately, 
individuals are exploiting these digital communication technologies to abuse, 
harass or commit acts of violence. Many of these offences fall into the category of 
image-based sexual abuse (IBSA), an umbrella term for all sexually abusive 
harms experienced by victims and includes the non-consensual creation of semi-
nude, nude or sexual or sexually explicit photographs and/or videos (intimate 
images), the non-consensual distribution of those intimate images, and the threat 
of distributing a victim’s intimate images (see DeKeseredy & Schwartz, 2016; 
McGlynn & Rackley, 2017; McGlynn, Rackley & Houghton, 2017; Henry & 
Powell, 2016; Powell & Henry, 2017). These researchers coined the term on the 
basis that all of these behaviours cause multiple and intersecting harms. McGlynn 
and Rackley (2017) have asserted that the term image-based sexual abuse (IBSA) 
accurately captures the severe harms inflicted on victims and that it is not limited 
to ex-partners seeking revenge and subscribing to non-consensual distribution of a 
victim’s images, but includes anyone who participates in the non-consensual 
distribution of a victim’s images (e.g., a joke, money or for no clear reason).  
 Powell, Henry, and Flynn (2018) created a typology for image-based 
sexual abuse with five categories (pp. 393- 394): 
(1) Relationship retribution, where revenge is a motivation within the context of a 






(2) Sextortion, where the perpetrator seeks to obtain further images, money, or 
unwanted sexual acts using existing images, or the threat of images, regardless of 
whether or not they exist; 
(3) Sexual voyeurism, where perpetrators are seeking to create or distribute 
images as a form of sexual gratification, including (but not limited to) 
“upskirting” and “down-blousing”;  
(4) Sexploitation, where the primary goal is to obtain monetary benefits through 
the trade of non-consensual imagery; and  
(5) Sexual assault, where perpetrators and/or bystanders record sexual assaults 
and rapes on mobile phones or other devices and then distribute those images via 
mobile phone or online.  
 Unlike previous definitions such as ‘revenge pornography’ (Salter & 
Crofts, 2015; Hall & Hearn, 2017) or ‘non-consensual pornography’ (e.g., Citron 
& Franks, 2014; Walker & Sleath, 2017; Suzor, Seignior, & Singleton, 2017), 
IBSA also acknowledges the non-consensual creation of intimate images and 
threats to distribute them. These researchers have established that the images may 
be a “selfie”-- taken by the victims themselves and shared with the offender, taken 
by another individual with or without the victim’s consent or the images may be 
digitally manipulated or superimposed to present a victim’s face or body in a 
sexual way. Offenders do not always inform the victim of their intentions to 
disclose the intimate images so not all victims are aware that their intimate images 
had been taken or distributed. In the most unfortunate circumstances, the offender 
also provides the victim’s personal information such as full name, e-mail address, 
employee designation and organisation, mobile phone number along with the 





broadcasting of identifiable information about an individual. When such 
information accompanies the victim’s intimate images, viewers of the content are 
able to crowdsource the contact details of those close to the victim such as the 
victim’s family members, friends, employers and co-workers and forward them 
the images and image hyperlinks and eventually make contact with the victim. 
This elevates the level of harm for the victim and increases the risk of repeat 
victimisation. 
 To stay abreast of global legislative trend against image-based sexual 
abuse, New Zealand’s Ministry of Justice introduced the Harmful Digital 
Communications Act 2015 (NZ) (the HDCA) in 2015. This legislation empowers 
legal representatives in New Zealand with greater autonomy over deterrence, 
denunciation and accountability for perpetrators and to deter, prevent and mitigate 
harm for victims. Section 22(1) of the Act describes the offence as: 
‘causing harm by posting digital communication’ and fulfills these 
conditions: 
(a) the person posts a digital communication with the intention that it 
cause harm to a victim; and 
(b) posting the communication would cause harm to an ordinary 
reasonable person in the position of the victim; and 
(c) posting the communication causes harm to the victim. (p. 14) 
 In Section 22(2) of the Harmful Digital Communications Act 2015 (NZ), 
to determine whether harm has been inflicted on the victim, the court takes into 
account any of the following factors: 
(a) the extremity of the language used;  





(c) whether the digital communication was anonymous;  
(d) whether the digital communication was repeated;  
(e) the extent of circulation of the digital communication;  
(f) whether the digital communication is true or false; and  
(g) the context in which the digital communication appeared. (p. 14) 
 As of June 2018, 24 people have been incarcerated due to HDCA offences 
with most of the incarcerations being IBSA-related offences and the majority of 
prosecutions involving relationship breakdowns (Ministry of Justice, 2018) which 
is congruent with previous research (Bloom, 2014; Dawkins, 2015; Larkin, 2014; 
Matsui, 2015; Osterday, 2016; Tungate, 2014). With reference to the prosecutions 
in New Zealand, most IBSA perpetration does not occur in isolation but within a 
larger context of domestic violence as the abuse tends to be carried out by scorned 
ex-partners (Bloom, 2014; Osterday, 2016) or occurs when the relationship 
breakdown is hostile and virulent (Daniels, 2014; Salter & Crofts, 2015). In this 
vein, a significant number of prosecutions have referenced the Domestic Violence 
Act 1995. In addition to prior domestic violence offences (e.g., male-assaults-
female) or gateway offences leading up to IBSA (e.g., intimate covert filming or 
blackmail), driving, drug and alcohol-related charges or convictions may also be 
present in the IBSA criminal context. 
 In the Domestic Violence Act (1995),  
“domestic violence, in relation to any person, means violence against that 
person by any other person with whom that person is, or has been, in a 
domestic relationship. 
(2) In this section, violence means— 





(b) sexual abuse: 
(c) psychological abuse, including, but not limited to,— 
 (i) intimidation: 
 (ii) harassment: 
 (iii) damage to property: 
 (iv) threats of physical abuse, sexual abuse, or psychological 
 abuse: 
 (iva) financial or economic abuse (for example, denying or limiting 
 access to financial resources, or preventing or restricting 
 employment opportunities or  access to education): 
 (v) in relation to a child, abuse of the kind set out in subsection 
 (3).” (p. 13) 
 A report by the Ministry of Justice (2018) indicated 18 HDCA 
prosecutions from 2015- 2016, 85 from 2016- 2017 and 107 from 2017- 2018. 
HDCA offences were disproportionately perpetrated by males (91%; 48 
convictions) with nearly 25 offenders (47%) being less than 30 years old with the 
highest prevalence being in the age band of 25-29 years (10 convictions), 
followed by 20-24 years (9 convictions) and 30-34 years (8 convictions). These 
statistics seem to align with previous research that has identified older teenagers 
and young adults being the at-risk groups of ISBA perpetration and victimisation 
due to their engagement in digital communications and exploration of intimate 
(romantic and sexual) relationships (Arnett, 2014). However, there appear to be 
more cases of IBSA in adults in their early thirties which suggests that other adult 
age bands need to be investigated as well. 





convictions), followed by Maori males (6 convictions) with Maori male 
convictions declining from 10 to 6 cases from mid-2016 to mid-2018. This 
contradicts in-the-flesh current family violence statistics in New Zealand where 
Maori are disproportionately overrepresented in family violence offences in 
2017/2018 (54% of offenders are Maori male- 3,595, 33% are European male- 
2176 and 660 were Pacific males) (Ministry of Justice, 2018). In regard to IBSA 
cases, NetSafe (October, 2018) stated that 21,632 images were reported since 
August 2016 with consistently 2 out of 3 victims being female. NetSafe also 
released a report on adult experiences of IBSA. Among the 1001 participants 
surveyed, Maori as opposed to Pakeha reported receiving more threats of 
disclosure rather than being victims of non-consensual intimate image 
dissemination (NetSafe, 2019). To better account for this and rule out sampling 
bias from generic surveys, the survey needs to be replicated in other samples. 
 Hall and Hearn (2017) analysed the database of My Ex.com, a revenge 
porn website. An approximation of 10,813 posts were in English with 9,285 posts 
created in the United States, 796 in the United Kingdom, 496 in Canada, 214 in 
Australia and 22 in New Zealand. Unfortunately, in cases where offenders 
anonymously disclosed the victim’s intimate images on websites specifically 
dedicated to retribution-style IBSA (e.g., revenge porn sites) or file sharing 
platforms that have little to no privacy protections for potential victims, such 
platforms are not legally obligated to adhere to takedown requests by the victim, 
New Zealand’s law enforcement or intermediary even with the HDCA in place. 
This only prolongs the harm inflicted on the victim. According to a conference 
report by NetSafe in October 2018, the takedown request success rate of a 





rates being approximately 90%, resolution rates being approximately 60% and the 
number of complainants potentially going to court being 5%.  
 Although retribution-style IBSA is not as prevalent as in-the-flesh 
domestic violence in New Zealand, unlike the Scottish legislation, New Zealand 
does not make exceptions for “reckless” posting of intimate images. The number 
of incarcerations since the HDCA was introduced demonstrates New Zealand’s 
firm stance against retribution-style IBSA. In this vein, it is critical that New 
Zealand’s criminal justice system is revised constantly for future legal proofing 
and that law enforcement is able to respond swiftly and effectively to this new 
legislation and cases of retribution-style IBSA. Law enforcement and policy 
makers may need to consider allocating more resources towards preventing 
further displacement of intimate partner violence into cyber space where the latter 
is indisputably more difficult to contain. It is also critical that law enforcement 
stays ahead of offenders who are becoming increasingly sophisticated in 
concealing their crimes and escaping the law or at worst, driving victims to 
suicide through persistent IBSA perpetration.  
 New Zealand’s HDCA aligns with legal research on retribution-style 
IBSA (Dawkins, 2015; Larkin, 2014) which assert that legislation should best 
reflect the manner in which people communicate in this modern era. It seems to 
support the legal position that effective legislation would shift the responsibility 
from the original creator of the intimate images (victim) to the individual who 
non-consensually discloses the image (perpetrator), emphasise consent within the 
context of an intimate relationship and include the seriousness of harms from 
retribution-style IBSA (Slane, 2013; Albury & Crawford, 2012; Powell, 2010; 





have broader societal implications by reinforcing the importance of consent 
within relationships and that consenting to having a picture taken does not equate 
to consent for the recipient to distribute it to others (Barmore, 2015; Gissell, 
2015). Virtual reality researchers also warn that there is a high probability of 3D 
virtual reality retribution-style IBSA accompanying the current demand of 3D 
virtual reality pornography (Ruberg, 2016; Stroud, 2014; Wood, Wood, & 
Balaam, 2017). As the HDCA was designed to be flexible and adaptable, as 
opposed to more traditional legislation that is more resistant to change, New 
Zealand is in an advantageous position to keep legislatively up-to-date with rapid 
digital advancements. 
1.2. Research Objectives  
 Law enforcement would be able to more effectively control IBSA by 
understanding: (i) how the internet and/or digital communications devices 
translate into a virtual crime scene, (ii) the layers of the internet and the 
information cycle and (iii) worse-case scenarios of IBSA (i.e., no guaranteed 
removal of all intimate images from the internet and persistent re-surfacing of 
images) along with the severity of harm on victims. Even though harmful digital 
communications offences are perpetrated online and not offline as is with 
traditional offending, it has been contended that such cases should be dealt with 
similar severity as sexual violence cases (see McGlynn & Rackley, 2017; Bloom, 
2014). 
 This explorative qualitative research aims to: (i) improve the 
understanding of offender decision making and perpetration of IBSA perpetrated 






spheres of domestic violence and the virtual environment (ii) understand the 
crime-commission process of IBSA perpetrated by former and current partners 
(retribution-style IBSA) through crime script analysis, (iii) improve police 
responses and crime prevention efforts to stay ahead of offenders in both technical 
and criminal sophistication through suggested crime script intervention points, 
(iv) assist with crime proofing and revising current legislation for retribution-style 
IBSA perpetrated through situational crime prevention measures, and (v) propose 
increased coordination and collaborative efforts among various stakeholders of 
the HDCA using thematic analysis. 
 Chapter 2 examines current literature relating to IBSA, drawing from 
various disciplines, and in Chapter 3, the context in dating, domestic violence and 
sexual abuse is established. Chapter 4 addresses crime theories and frameworks 
pertinent to the study, Chapter 5 details the Method for understanding the crime-
commission process (Part I) and prevention (Part II) of retribution-style IBSA, 
and Chapters 6 and 7 address the Results of both sections. Lastly, Chapter 8 














Chapter 2. Literature Review of IBSA 
 The majority of literature on retribution-style IBSA has been dominated 
by sociological, gender studies and feminist legal approaches with sexting 
literature being mostly dominated by the psychological field. What remains a fact 
in New Zealand and many other countries alike is that adult perpetrated IBSA is 
not immediately or necessarily classified as “criminal” unlike adult-to-child IBSA 
perpetration (i.e., child pornography cases). Investigations on the latter tend to be 
investigated immediately and seen to completion by law enforcement. Being the 
first Crime Science study on IBSA, this research draws from multiple disciplines 
to aid in understanding the crime-commission process of retribution-style IBSA 
and examines the criminal actors, spaces and crime interactions of retribution-
style IBSA in greater detail. This extensive review of literature also aids in 
proposing recommendations and streamlining the focus for situational crime 
prevention of retribution-style IBSA and potentially assists frontline law 
enforcement with identifying “criminal” variables of IBSA which warrant further 
investigation and responding more effectively to victims. An attempt is made to 
operationalise criminal forms of retribution-style IBSA for future attempts to 
study trends of IPV displacement into the virtual space and, to evaluate the 
effectiveness of the HDCA as a deterrent given the increasing complexity, 
pervasiveness, severity and concealability of cyber crime. 
2.1. Knowing the perpetrator 
 Limited literature on gender and IBSA perpetration revealed that 
perpetrators were likely to report that their victim was male as female (Gámez-
Guadix, Almendros, Borrajo, & Calvete, 2015; Lenhart, Ybarra, & Price-Feeney, 





males were more likely to self-disclose being IBSA perpetrators than females 
(Powell, Henry, Flynn, & Scott, 2019; Ruvalcaba & Eaton, 2019). 
An international study by Powell et al. (2019) investigated the extent and nature 
of IBSA perpetration in a community sample of Australian residents aged 16 to 49 
years. The researchers found that 1 in 10 participants engaged in IBSA 
perpetration behaviours such as the non-consensual taking of nude/ sexual images 
of another individual, threatening to distribute or distributing the images.  
 With regard to perpetrator-victim relationship, of the study’s self-reported 
IBSA perpetration (covert intimate photo taking), 40.1% of participants reported 
ever taking a nude or sexual image of an intimate partner or ex-partner, followed 
by 20.5% targeting a friend and 20.2% targeting a family member. For IBSA 
perpetration (non-consensual distribution), 29.8% of participants targeted a friend, 
22.8% targeted an intimate partner or ex-partner. For IBSA perpetration 
(threatening to distribute), 34.8% of participants targeted a friend, 24.7% targeted 
a family member and 22.2% targeted an intimate partner or ex-partner. The rest of 
the participants targeted work colleagues or ex-work colleagues, an acquaintance, 
a stranger or did not know the nature of their relationship with the victim. 
However, it was not clear in the study why IBSA perpetration (non-consensual 
distribution) targeted at a “friend” was higher than ex-partners and intimate 
partners or why IBSA perpetration (threats to distribute) targeting a family 
member was highest. A possible explanation could be that men underreported 
committing abuse against ex-partners and intimate partners due to social 
desirability bias and their awareness of societal condemnation of intimate partner 
violence (Cercone, Beach, & Arias, 2005). Non-heterosexual (gay or bisexual) 





heterosexual males or females. This is consistent with a study by Garcia et al. 
(2016) which found that more men (25%) than women (20%) had ‘shared a 
received sexy photo with someone else’ and that gay men were twice as likely as 
lesbian women to non-consensually distribute such images. Similarly, Ruvalcaba 
and Eaton’s (2019) U.S study found that overall, regardless of sexual orientation, 
men were significantly represented as perpetrators but gay men were more likely 
to perpetrate such behaviours compared to heterosexual men. These researchers 
suggest that gay and bisexual men are at greater risk of perpetration (and 
victimisation) than heterosexual men.  
 The findings from Powell et al. (2019) clearly support the five typologies 
of IBSA (see Powell & Henry, 2018) and contradict narrower definitions of IBSA 
such as ‘revenge pornography’ (Hall & Hearn, 2017, Salter & Crofts, 2015) or 
‘non-consensual pornography’ (see Citron & Franks, 2014; Poole, 2015; Suzor, 
Seignior, & Singleton, 2017; Walker & Sleath, 2017). Their study was also 
significant in identifying relationships between sexuality and IBSA perpetration. 
Although the study lacked generalisability (e.g., overrepresentation of non-
heterosexuals and a high level of educated participants in their large community 
sample) and the inability to provide insight into the experiences, perspectives and 
motivations of the self-reported IBSA perpetrators (e.g., in the larger context of 
domestic, sexual or family violence), the findings suggest that gender and 
sexuality are significant in understanding the degree and nature of IBSA 
experiences. Consistent with sexual violence literature, the vast majority of 
victims were known to the perpetrator (see Clay-Warner & Burt, 2005) with 
almost half of the perpetrators being intimate partners or ex-partners but the 





harassment or abuse in the context of intimate relationships including familial and 
friendship circumstances. 
 Hall and Hearn (2017) analysed texts that accompanied nude or sexual 
image uploads on a well-known ‘revenge porn’ website. From the texts, the 
researchers identified that the majority of images posted were of women and were 
posted by men who were communicating normative masculine identities and re-
institutionalising themselves as ‘real men’ within the largely male community of 
website users. This suggests that male (as opposed to female) perpetration is 
largely prevalent on revenge porn sites. In a more extensive study, Uhl, Rhyner, 
Terrance, and Lugo (2018) conducted a content analysis of 134 non-consensual 
photos contained on seven different websites which may not function specifically 
for the purpose of hosting, promoting ‘revenge porn’ or explicitly harming 
victims. The researchers found that 92% of victims depicted in the images were 
women and that more than a third of the images had texts accompanying them 
which explained the perpetrator’s reasons for sharing the women’s image with the 
most common being that she was an ‘ex’ (22%), ‘hot’ or ‘sexy’ (22%), ‘a slut’ 
(15%), or unfaithful (6%).  
 These findings indicate that while some IBSA perpetration may be 
motivated by relationship retribution, in other instances, it may be more related to 
other motivations such as status-seeking among online male-dominated 
communities which is consistent with previous research by Yeung, Horyniak, 
Vella, Hellard, and Lim (2014) that found that male IBSA perpetration was 
motivated by demonstrations of sexual success. To-date, no studies have 
identified an overrepresentation of females in IBSA perpetration (threats to 





sexual images) within or outside the intimate relationship context. 
2.2. Individual Characteristics of IBSA Perpetrators 
2.2.1. Sexist beliefs 
 Although the research is still in its infancy, there has been support for the 
association between psychological characteristics and the perpetration of 
retribution-style IBSA. 
Henry and Powell (2016) argue that IBSA is a form of gendered violence with the 
risk of victimisation being higher for females and the negative impacts 
experienced by female victims being greater due to gender and societal 
expectations and norms. While some researchers emphasise the importance of 
examining sexist beliefs towards gender roles, behaviours, and relationships 
within a society in understanding sexual violence, especially towards women 
(Glick & Fiske, 1996, 2011, 2018), others argue that in the context of retribution-
style IBSA, it is too simplistic to solely attribute violence to misogynistic 
endeavours and pornographic practices that are aimed at degrading women. The 
latter argue the significance of the internet’s allowance for anonymity enhances 
freedom of expression and autonomy of constructing and altering the online self 
which in turn creates a culture of fast and anonymous relationship retribution, 
encouraging uncivil or criminal activity (Stroud & Pye, 2013; Hlavach & 
Freivogel, 2011; Stroud, 2014). However, other researchers have sought to 
quantify sexist ideologies such as the Ambivalent Sexism Inventory (Glick & 
Fiske, 1996) and utilise this inventory to demonstrate the relationship between 
sexism and the perpetration of technology-facilitated violence and dating violence 
perpetration (Martinez-Pecino & Durán, 2016; Morelli, Bianchi, Baiocco, Pezzuti 





A study by Morelli et al. (2016) used self-reported perpetrators’ perspectives to 
examine the relationship between sexist beliefs, retribution-style IBSA 
perpetration and dating violence perpetration. In their Italian sample of 13 to 30 
year-olds, IBSA perpetration was found to be weakly but significantly related to 
both dating violence perpetration and benevolent and hostile sexism after 
controlling for age, gender and sexual orientation. This means that benevolent 
sexism could act as a protective factor for retribution-style IBSA perpetration 
whilst hostile sexism could be a risk factor for retribution-style IBSA 
perpetration. These researchers support the deconstruction of gender stereotypes 
in “bystander” prevention programmes for retribution-style IBSA perpetration. 
2.2.2. The Dark Triad 
 The socially aversive traits of Machiavellianism, psychopathy, and 
narcissism are referred to as the ‘Dark Triad’ of personality (Paulhus & Williams, 
2002). Collectively, the Dark Triad traits are characterised by high levels of 
callousness, low empathy, egocentrism and readiness to exploit others (Jones & 
Paulhus, 2011b, 2014). Individuals high in psychopathy possess psychopathic 
callousness which manifests behaviourally as the quick action for instant 
gratification. Such behaviour persists due to these individuals’ severe lack of 
empathy for others and poor self-control (Jones & Paulhus, 2011a) which 
contributes to their sudden and frequent abandonments of relationships without 
any discomfort or regard for their personal circumstances (Hare & Neumann, 
2008). This impulsivity or poor self-control can be present in criminal (Hare & 
Neumann, 2008) and non-criminal behavioural presentations (Hall & Benning, 
2006) of psychopathy. Machiavellianism refers to an individual’s constant 





manipulation and deception of others solely for personal gain or self-interest 
whilst narcissism is characteristic of individuals with high levels of self-perceived 
grandiosity and entitlement (Jones & Paulhus, 2014) that is motivated by ego 
reinforcement (Bushman, Bonacci, van Dijk, & Baumeister, 2003). Even though 
callous affect is present in all three socially aversive traits, it has different 
motivations (i.e., psychopathy is motivated by a lack of empathy and self-control, 
Machiavellianism is motivated by personal gain or self interest and narcissism is 
motivated by ego inflation and reinforcement). When all three traits are combined, 
the individual would possess a disposition towards engaging in self-interested and 
anti-social behaviours to attain one’s own goals (Koehn, Okan & Jonason, 2018). 
 In this vein, researchers have demonstrated a relationship between the 
Dark Triad and technology-facilitated sexual violence perpetration behaviours 
such as greater proclivity to sexually harassing others (Zeigler-Hill, Besser, 
Morag, & Campbell, 2016), and deriving pleasure from partaking in such 
perpetration (Buckels, Trapnell, & Paulhus, 2014). Moreover, a higher 
endorsement of psychopathy, Machiavellianism and narcissism was reported to be 
a significant predictor of ‘romantic revenge’ proclivity after experiencing 
infidelity (Brewer, Hunt, James, & Abell, 2015) and following a relationship 
breakdown (Rasmussen & Boom, 2014). Although Brewer et al., (2015) only 
utilised a female sample in their Dark Triad and romantic revenge study, they did 
not specifically examine the Dark Triad in retribution-style IBSA female 
perpetration.  
 On the other hand, a study by Kokkinos, Antoniadou and Markos (2014) 
identified that traits of psychopathy such as high levels of irresponsibility and low 





study by Pina, Holland and James (2018) identified a relationship between higher 
endorsement of Dark Triad traits and ambivalent sexism and greater self-reported 
proclivity to engage in retribution-style IBSA perpetration behaviours. Although 
the latter study detected positive correlations with retribution-style IBSA 
enjoyment and narcissism and Machiavellianism, only narcissism was an 
independent predictor of retribution-style IBSA enjoyment. The researchers 
suggested that unlike Machiavellianism, narcissistic traits could be unique to 
retribution-style IBSA enjoyment as this enjoyment may enhance the narcissistic 
individual’s perception and experience of control, and provide the necessary ego 
reinforcement (Jones & Paulhus, 2014) which becomes important after a failed 
relationship. Although the study by Pina et al. (2018) comprised mostly female 
participants, their findings took into account the psychological characteristics of 
narcissism and sexism which have been consistently identified as being prevalent 
among male participants and retribution-style IBSA perpetrators in the broader 
context of sexual violence. 
 Contradicting findings were reported in a study by Clancy, Klettke and 
Hallford (2019) that used a large convenience sample of 505 young Australian 
adults and tested the hypothesis that non-consensual dissemination of a victim’s 
self-taken and shared intimate images (sexts) is associated with positive 
subjective norms and personal attitudes towards, and dark triad personality traits. 
The researchers identified four unique predictors of the increased likelihood of 
non-consensual sext dissemination: being sexually active, having stronger positive 
attitudes towards the non-consensual dissemination of sexts as being funny, 
having received a sext and more strongly normalising that sexts are usually 





engaging in non-consensual dissemination of sexts was if the participant who had 
engaged in sexting had personally experienced negative consequences of their 
image(s) being shared without their consent. Although the researchers found 
significant associations between the Dark Triad personality traits and sext 
dissemination with Machiavellianism having the strongest relationship, the effect 
sizes were too small to detect any independent relationship between Dark Triad 
traits and sext dissemination. However, they acknowledged that the predictors 
used in their study (e.g., finding dissemination funny or not a big deal) could be 
proxies for dark-triad related disseminated motivations which point to a lack of 
empathy especially if participants were already aware of the potential negative 
consequences experienced by a victim of sex dissemination—all of which warrant 
further investigation into the potentially “dark” motivations of sext dissemination 
behaviours.  
2.2.3. Sadistic Tendencies 
 Pathological (extreme) sadism manifests itself as a sadistic personality-- 
an individual who intentionally incites physical, sexual or psychological harm 
upon others to demean and humiliate them, whilst being motivated by his/her 
quest for enjoyment and assertion of power and authority (O’Meara, Davies, & 
Hammond, 2011). Other researchers have investigated the subclinical form of 
sadism or ‘everyday sadism’ (Baumeister & Campbell, 1999) which extends 
beyond acting out (externalising) anger (Bushman & Whitaker, 2010), 
psychopathic instrumental aggression (Fedoroff, 2008; Malamuth, 2003; 
Woodworth & Porter, 2002), and callous narcissistic entitlement (Baumeister, 
Catanese, & Wallace, 2002; Campbell, Bonacci, Shelton, Exline, & Bushman, 





aggression in sadists, Buckels, Jones and Paulhus (2013) used a white-noise-
aggression paradigm. The researchers found that sadists, psychopaths, narcissists, 
and those low in empathy and perspective taking displayed aggressive behaviour 
towards an innocent person when unprovoked. However, among the dark 
personalities (i.e., subclinical psychopathy, subclinical narcissism, and 
Machiavellianism), only sadists increased the intensity of their attacks once they 
realised the individual would not retaliate and only sadists were willing to expend 
time and energy (i.e., incur a personal cost) towards hurting an innocent person. 
These researchers concluded that unlike other dark personalities, sadists possess 
an intrinsic motivation towards sadism and that sadistic behaviour may even be 
rewarding, outweighing any personal cost incurred by the sadistic aggressor 
(sadist).  
 Moving beyond research that limits sadism to a sexual disorder that is 
exclusive to hardened criminals (Mokros, Osterheider, Hucker, & Nitschke, 
2011), everyday sadism has been a significant predictor of in-the-flesh sexual 
violence (Russell & King, 2016) and online sexual violence (Buckels et al., 2014). 
Although a more recent study by Pina et al. (2018) found no significant 
relationship between retribution-style IBSA perpetration proclivity and sadistic 
tendencies, these researchers attributed this to an unanticipated gender 
skewedness (i.e., 82 females and 16 males) in their sample. Moreover, (Buckles & 
Paulhus, 2012) found that males (as opposed to females) are disproportionately 
represented in those who endorse sadistic tendencies. This is consistent with 
males being overrepresented in retribution-style IBSA perpetration (e.g., threats to 
distribute, covert intimate photo taking and filming or non-consensual distribution 





 In summary, there is currently only limited research into the extent and  
nature of IBSA perpetration, and individual characteristics of IBSA perpetrators.  
2.3. Social Psychological and Sociological Processes of IBSA perpetration 
2.3.1. Theory of Reasoned Action 
 The theory of reasoned action (Azjen & Fishbein, 1975) demonstrates that 
an individual’s participation in a specific voluntary behaviour can be predicted by 
the individual’s intention to engage in the behaviour. The intentions to voluntarily 
engage in any behaviour depend on an individual's attitudes (personal beliefs 
about the behaviour and positive or negative consequences of the outcome) and 
subjective norms (self-perceptions of peer perceptions towards engaging in the 
behaviour and the motivation to conform to peer norms). The theory of reasoned 
action posits that the behaviour would occur if the individual’s attitude towards 
the behaviour is positive and would be well-received by peers.  
Building on Hudson and Fetro’s (2015) study that applied the theory of reasoned 
action (Ajzen & Fishbein, 1975) to the propensity to engage in sexting 
behaviours, Clancy et al. (2019) incorporated the theory of reasoned action to 
investigate whether subjective norms and attitudes concerning the non-consensual 
dissemination of sexts were related to non-consensual sexts dissemination 
behaviours and dark triad personality traits of Machiavellianism, psychopathy and 
narcissism. The study’s findings were consistent with the theory of reasoned 
action whereby participants who believed that non-consensual sext dissemination 
was a positive experience (amusing, harmless, no big deal and as a joke), that 
sexts are typically seen by a larger audience, that it is acceptable to disseminate 
sexts after a relationship breakdown and can enhance social status among peers 





More specifically, when gender was analysed in relation to attitudes and norms, it  
was found that males (40.7%) were disproportionately more likely than females 
(5%) to endorse that non-consensual dissemination of sexts can enhance social 
status. Males were also more likely to perceive such disclosure as funny and that 
it is acceptable to engage in such behaviours after a relationship breakdown, 
suggesting the importance of gender roles and expectations around non-
consensual sext dissemination and the perceived male gender-specific rewards 
(e.g., increased social status and male peer acceptance) associated with engaging 
in such behaviours compared to females.  
 Also consistent with the theory of reasoned action, the researchers found 
that negative attitudes towards non-consensual sext dissemination originate from 
having personally experienced negative consequences of sext dissemination which 
in turn reduce the proclivity towards engaging in non-consensual sext 
dissemination. The researchers acknowledged that only 20% of their sample 
reported IBSA perpetration and attributed this to social desirably bias (Edwards, 
1953) whereby there is a possibility that the participants failed to disclose prior 
participation in IBSA perpetration behaviours and provided more socially 
acceptable responses. Although the study demonstrated the significance of norms 
and attitudes in shaping IBSA perpetration behaviours and gender disparities in 
norms and attitudes, the convenience sample utilised in this study limited the 
generalisability of the findings. Moreover, the survey did not query the 
perpetrator-victim relationship context (e.g., non-sexual acquaintance, former or 
current sexual partner in a committed romantic relationship, former or current 
casual sex partner), frequency of perpetration or the gender of the person in the 





motivations and severity of IBSA perpetration. 
2.3.2. Male Peer Support Theory 
 Opposing generic male stream theories (e.g., DeKeserdy, Dragiewicz, & 
Schwartz, 2017; Heimer & Messerschmidt, 1994), male peer support theorists 
argue that there are unmarked structures and normalised behaviours in online and 
offline spaces whereby male peer influence is a significant contributor to an 
individual male’s victimisation of women. More specifically, all-male groups 
encourage, justify and support the abuse and victimisation of women in the effort 
to repair “damaged patriarchal masculinity” inflicted on men by current or former 
female partners (Lilly, Cullen, & Ball, 2010; Heimer & Messerschmidt, 1994; 
Raphael, 2001). In the context of a relationship breakdown whereby the woman 
exits a relationship, male peer support motivates a man to commit acts of violence 
against the woman he “can no longer control” (Bourgois, 1995, p. 214).  
 DeKeseredy and Schwartz (2013) argue that various offline environments 
are fertile platforms for the provision of male peer informational support (i.e., 
verbally and publicly disseminated guidance and advice) that support sexually 
violent and other abusive acts against women as legitimate avenues of upholding 
of patriarchal authority and control. These scholars argue that the male peer 
support theory influences the “patriarchal” male to model after the pro-abuse 
attitudes and behaviours of his equally (if not more abusive) male counterparts 
who engage in sexually, physically and/or psychologically abusive acts against 
their own intimate partners. Failing to restore patriarchal order when a woman is 
considering leaving or leaves a relationship with him would subject him to 
ridicule as he is unable to “control his woman” (DeKeseredy, Rogness, & 





and exchange” (Wilson & Daly, 1992, p. 85).  
 In support of the male peer support theory in the online environment, there 
are patriarchal online communities that provide support for violence against 
women (see Crisafi, Mullins, & Jasinski, 2016) and other male peer support 
subcultures including men who patronise revenge pornography sites and “catalyse 
a campaign of harassment” against women they possess misogynistic attitudes 
towards (Salter & Crofts, 2015, p. 239). DeKeseredy and Schwartz (2016) argue 
that IBSA is an effective way to perpetrate violent acts against a woman when she 
cannot be physically located, is living abroad or if the offender knows her location 
but has received a restraining order and is therefore prohibited from physically 
meeting or contacting her through electronic means. Patriarchal online 
communities and other male peer support subcultures including men on revenge 
pornography sites IBSA perpetrators may share similar motivations of 
humiliation, degradation, and control with rapists and resort to in-the-flesh sexual 
violence and sexual violent acts via digital communications technologies and 
patriarchal online communities. However, as the literature suggests, no studies 
have explicitly compared the motivations of a sexual violence perpetrator with 
those of an IBSA perpetrator.  
2.4. Perceptions of IBSA Perpetration and Victimisation 
2.4.1. Public Perspectives of IBSA Victimisation 
Much of the negative media attention on sexting has focused on the notion that 
careless young women indiscriminately share their nude images without 
considering the potential risks involved (Albury & Crawford, 2012). This is 
consistent with research of the blaming of predominantly female victims 





that women generally do not send their nude images to strangers and that a level  
of trust is necessary before women partake in such an activity (Samimi & 
Anderson, 2014; Dir, Coskunpinar, Steiner & Cyders, 2013). This counters 
arguments about naive, irresponsible women “not knowing any better” and falling 
prey to retribution-style IBSA. Moreover, when comparing the negative 
consequences of retribution-style IBSA, women are more likely to have sexually 
violent acts committed against them by someone they know rather than a stranger 
(Clay-Warner & Burt, 2005). Unfortunately the fundamental attribution error 
otherwise known as an individual’s bias in attributing another individual’s 
behaviour to more internal than external (situational causes) (see Hogg & 
Vaughan, 2005) perpetuates victim blaming for IBSA victims. 
 On a policy level, online safety and anti-sexting campaigns have also 
fuelled female victim blaming with their focus being on “correcting” deviant 
female sexual self-image taking and sharing rather than males who are more likely 
to non-consensually disclose and circulate such intimate images (Fleschler Peskin 
et al., 2013; Karaian, 2013). These campaigns were implemented based on a ‘risk 
management’ model of sexual violence, whereby women’s bodies are defined as 
risks and hence women are inherently at risk and are accountable for the 
management and mitigation of this risk (Albury & Crawford, 2012). This shifts 
the blame away from the perpetrator and the perpetrator’s violation of the victim’s 
privacy.  
 Walker, Sanci and Temple-Smith (2013) established the importance of the 
gendered nature of sexting after interviewing a sample of 15 to 20 year-olds. The 
researchers reported that young women experience feelings of being pressured 





images which could be used in future as blackmail or for retribution and uploaded  
on sites that are utilised by males who upload images of their female ex-partners. 
Young females who send such images were perceived as “slutty girls,” “whores,” 
“skanky little girls,” or “just an idiot for sending it in the first place” (Walker et 
al., 2013) and deserving of the negative consequences of sexting (i.e., non-
consensual disclosure of their images). Young males also frequently blamed 
young female victims for their victimisation on the basis that the females 
consented to sharing their images. This is consistent with Jane’s (2012) argument 
on victim-blaming that emphasises the indifference towards the increasingly 
hostile and misogynic nature of the cybersphere. This indifference is exacerbated 
by notions that IBSA perpetration is a “harmless prank” and victim-survivors are 
“hypersensitive or humourless”. These misconceptions also explain why IBSA 
producers and site hosts are rarely admonished. Based on public narratives, 
sexualised private images of partially clad females are perceived as “slutty” and 
shameful whilst sexually explicit images of males are perceived as commonplace 
(Daniels & Zurbriggen, 2016). To-date, there is no literature exploring differences 
in how IBSA is experienced by male and female victims. 
 Another qualitative study that utilised samples of 13 to 15 year-olds (UK) 
and 15 to 17 year-olds (Australia) reported similar negative appraisals of female 
victims (as compared to male victims) whereby the females are responsible on the 
account that they volunteered for sexual self-taking and sharing of their intimate 
images such as “not thinking or “poor choices” by females (Dobson & Ringrose, 
2016). The qualitative studies support the gendered nature of retribution-style 
IBSA victimisation which blames females and absolves male perpetrators of 





conducted discourse analysis on gendered perceptions and experiences of 
retribution-style IBSA and demonstrated how the female subject was positioned 
as a “silly” young female victim or responsible for “sexting going wrong”. The 
discourse positioned the female as deviant and accountable for her own 
victimisation whilst the male was absolved of any responsibility in non-
consensually disclosing her intimate images. Findings in other literature support 
this “deviant discourse” surrounding “female” sexting behaviours (Angelides, 
2013; Karaian, 2013; Lee & Crofts, 2015). Lee and Crofts (2015) argue that the 
focus should not be on the female sexter’s behaviour but the perpetrator’s non-
consensual disclosure of the victim’s intimate images and that educational 
campaigns should focus on the non-consensual distribution of the image as the 
problematic behavior that needs to be addressed (see Angelides, 2013; Karaian, 
2013).  
 Drawing from literature on rape myth acceptance (e.g., Bohner, Eyssel, 
Pina, Siebler & Viki, 2009) and rape perpetrator leniency and victim blaming 
(e.g., Maier, 2014; Sleath & Bull, 2009), Hatcher (2016) examined victim and 
perpetrator blame in retribution-style IBSA using cases that focus on the 
contribution of relationship duration, the nature of media capture and victim 
cheating behaviour. It was found that both rape myth acceptance and victim 
infidelity were significant predictors of retribution-style IBSA victim blaming. 
Another study by Knieps and Hatcher (2016) investigated the effect of good and 
bad break ups on retribution-style IBSA and found that the endorsement of gender 
norms was a significant mediator for retribution-style IBSA acceptance and that a 
“bad” relationship breakup was a direct predictor for the acceptance of certain 





These insights which take into consideration the context of relationships rather  
than specifically focusing on public perceptions and attitudes towards sexting 
behaviours, have implications on the understanding of retribution-style IBSA 
perpetration and the design of prevention programmes. 
2.4.2. Sex of IBSA Victim, Perpetrator and Observer 
 Research has identified the importance of the sex of victims and 
perpetrators in shaping observers’ perceptions of severity and accountability 
intimate partner violence such as domestic violence, rape and stalking. In these 
contexts, with a male perpetrator and female victim, observers’ perceive 
intervention as necessary and the impact of the situation on the victim as more 
severe (Corbally, 2015; Runtz, & O’Donnell, 2003; Scott, Rajakaruna, Sheridan, 
& Gavin, 2015; Vandiver, & Dupalo, 2012). Conversely, in contexts with female 
perpetrators and male victims, male victims are less likely to be taken seriously 
and are more likely to be perceived as responsible for the situation (Seelau & 
Seelau, 2005; Sheridan, Gillett, Davies, Blaauw, & Patel, 2003; Gavin & Scott, 
2016). Other research has reported that female (rather than male) observers are 
more likely to perceive such situations as serious (Finnegan & Timmons Fritz, 
2012; Pierce & Harris, 1993; Scott et al., 2015; Seelau, Seelau, & Poorman, 2003) 
and that they are more sympathetic towards the victim and are less likely to hold 
the victim responsible (Grubb & Turner, 2012; Home, 1994; Whatley, 2005; 
Yamawaki, Ochoa-Shipp, Pulsipher, Harlos, & Swindler, 2012).  
 A UK university cohort study by Scott and Gavin (2018) that investigated 
the influence of a victim’s sex, observer’s sex and observer’s sexting experience 
on perceptions of severity and accountability in the context of retribution-style 





retribution-style IBSA as more severe when the perpetrator is male and the victim  
is female rather than vice versa. However, the sexes of the perpetrator and victim  
did not influence female observers’ perceptions of the severity of retribution-style 
IBSA. Respondents with sexting experience were more likely to perceive 
retribution-style IBSA as less severe and attribute less blame to the victim 
compared to respondents with no sexting experience. However, the sample was 
not representative of the general adult population, excluded observer’s perceptions 
of non-heterosexual individuals, retribution-style IBSA in longer-term 
relationships or other relationship contexts such as ‘married but separating’.  
 Similarly, Bothamley and Tully’s (2018) vignette study examined 
variables that may influence public perceptions of IBSA and victim blaming using 
an online survey administered to 168 adults from the UK. The researchers 
identified that harm minimisation and victim blaming attitudes towards IBSA 
victims were more prevalent among males than females and that females rated 
police intervention as more necessary compared to males across all conditions. 
Although their study cited a few limitations reducing the generalisability of the 
study’s findings such as a significant gender imbalance in the sample, the sample 
being skewed towards mental health professionals, and a lack of specificity in 
defining the length of relationship in their vignettes, the study did highlight the 
need for future research to examine the meaningfulness of a relationship and the 
length of a relationship and overlaps that might be present. The researchers did 
conclude that the public generally did not blame victims of IBSA which could 
serve as reassurance for IBSA victims in coming forward without being blamed 
for their victimisation.  





presented contradicting findings between male and female participant appraisals  
of the severity of IBSA victimisation (Fido et al., 2018). It was hypothesised that  
females with higher levels of intrasexual competition (see Fisher & Cox, 2010) 
would resort to more rival derogation strategies such as ‘slut shaming’ towards 
female IBSA victims (see Ringrose & Renold, 2012) and therefore judge female 
victims more harshly. Contrary to the hypothesis, the researchers found that high 
levels of intrasexual competition was associated with more lenient judgments 
made by female participants about IBSA offences involving male victims. The 
researchers suggested that additional traits associated with high female intrasexual 
competition such as female sexual interest and sexual promiscuity could account 
for this result although these variables were not measured in their study. Female 
participants did not judge same-sex victims more harshly than male participants 
nor did their attractiveness ratings of the female victim have any effect on their 
judgments. The researchers explained that this could be due to the participants 
themselves participating in sexual image taking and sharing themselves and 
therefore being able to better empathise with victims. Evidently, further in-depth 
study is necessary to draw firmer conclusions about the leniency and/or harshness 
when judging same-sex IBSA victims. The main limitation of the study as 
acknowledged by the researchers was that the samples used are only “culturally” 
representative of the UK. This evolutionary psychology study on IBSA is a strong 
contender against the larger body of literature which contextualises IBSA within 
gender inequality stemming from patriarchal structures (see McGlynn et al., 
2017). 
2.4.3. Victim Help-seeking Behaviours and Challenges Reporting IBSA 





IBSA victims’ help-seeking behaviours, when posed this question: “Who did you  
turn to for help when you discovered that images of you had been shared without  
your consent?” the three most common responses were no-one (72.95%), 
followed by friends (20.08%), and website(s) where the image(s) were uploaded 
(7.49%). In their sample of 3,044 U.S adults, only 34% of female and 18% of 
male victims sought help. Of the female victims who reported not seeking help, 
39.07% reported that they were embarrassed, afraid (14.57%) and not bothered 
(12.58%) whereas for male victims who reported not seeking help, 59.14% 
reported that they were not bothered (59.14%), were embarrassed (12.90%) and 
afraid (4.30%). These findings are consistent with reactions by in-the-flesh sexual 
assault victims. Weiss (2010) reported that male victims of sexual assault blamed 
themselves, felt shame, were too embarrassed to report the assault to the police 
and feared that their private/ sexual pasts would be exposed to the public. Koss 
(2006) also found that sexual assault victims were less likely to report 
acquaintances, current or former partners to the police compared to strangers due 
to feelings of shame, embarrassment and the belief that the police would turn 
them away. Other researchers found that among university students, acquaintance 
and/or ex-partner rape was treated as more severe than stranger rape with victims 
from the former being more susceptible to victim blaming (see Krahé, Temkin, & 
Bieneck, 2007). When applied to IBSA victims, these attitudes could negatively 
reduce victim help-seeking behaviours. 
 These gendered differences in reporting lend support to gender-
frameworks of IBSA perpetration: the male (perpetrator) and female (victim) dyad 
(Henry & Powell, 2015; Salter & Crofts, 2015) and the negative mental health 





female compared to male victims (Bates, 2017). The consequences for female  
victims were found to extend beyond humiliation and embarrassment with many  
victims being impacted professionally (i.e., they lose their job from the 
dissemination of their intimate images or out of fear that the perpetrator would 
carry out the threat and publish their images (Cooper, 2016; Kamal & Newman, 
2016), suicide ideation and other maladaptive coping mechanisms (Bates, 2017). 
Researchers also found that bisexual women were at highest risk of IBSA 
victimisation, followed by other sexual minorities such as non-heterosexual 
(bisexual and gay) males. As sexual minorities are held to heteronormative 
standards by society (Dwyer, 2015) and in their own relationships (Rosenkrantz & 
Mark, 2018) and are assumed to be heterosexual (Nadal et al., 2011), they would 
face additional challenges seeking help for IBSA without exposing their 
stigmatised identities. 
 An online panel survey of 4053 Australian residents (aged 16- 49 years) 
by Powell et el. (2019) reported that after controlling for other participant 
characteristics, self-reported retribution-style IBSA perpetrators tended to blame 
victims more and that attitudinally, participants who blamed retribution-style 
IBSA victims and accepted sexual image-based abuse myths included in the 
researchers’ newly developed sexual image-based abuse myth acceptance 
(SIAMA) scale (see Payne, Lonsway, & Fitsgerald, 1999; Powell & Webster, 
2018), were more likely to have been/ be perpetrators themselves. These findings 
are consistent with attitudinal research on other forms of sexual aggression such 
as rape myths (see Payne et al., 1999; Pina et al., 2018; Powell & Webster, 2018). 
However, the researchers concluded that sexual self-image taking and exchanging 





perpetration (1 in 10) in their study and victimisation in a prior study (1 in 5, see  
Henry et al., 2017) are far lower than overall engagement in sexual self-image  
(‘selfie’) behaviours. Hence, the majority of participants who engage in sexual 
self-image taking and sexting do not experience retribution-style IBSA 
victimisation or engage in perpetration (Powell et al., 2019) contradicting prior 
literature that has presented a deviant female discourse and self-image taking and 
sexting as the cause of victimisation. 
2.4.4. Adult Sexting and Intimate Relationships 
 Other studies examining adult relationship satisfaction and self-image 
taking and sexting and behaviours have demonstrated that adult individuals in 
committed, romantic relationships are more likely to sext than those not in a 
relationship (Delevi & Weisskirch, 2013; Dir et al., 2013; Perkins, Becker, Tehee, 
& Mackelprang, 2014; Samimi & Alderson, 2014) and that sexting may be 
beneficial to adult relationship satisfaction (Parker, Blackburn, Perry, & Hawks, 
2013; Stasko & Gellar, 2015) especially for married and unmarried couples with 
insecure (anxious) attachment styles (McDaniel & Drouin, 2015; Weisskirch & 
Develi, 2011; Weisskirvh, Drouin, & Delevi, 2016). Drouin, Coupe and Temple 
(2017) recruited 352 participants in their online study about adult sexting 
experiences. The researchers found that almost 58% of adult participants had 
engaged in sexting and about 50% of those who engaged in sexting experienced 
positive sexual and emotional outcomes in their intimate relationships. However, 
there were noticeable gender differences in sexting behaviours and appraisal of 
negative consequences in committed and casual relationships. For example, males 
were twice as likely to have sexted with a casual partner than with a committed 





partner than with a casual partner. Overall, both sexes reported more negative  
emotional consequences (e.g., worry and regret) when they had sexted in a casual  
relationship but females reported more worry, regret and trauma when they had 
sexted in casual relationship. This research is consistent with prior literature 
highlighting the higher emotional costs and reduced emotional benefits in casual 
sexual hookups (Owen & Finchman, 2011; Mark, Garcia, & Fisher, 2015). For 
men, the casual or committed context of their relationship did not influence the 
amount of regret, worry and trauma experienced from sexting. Adult sexting and 
healthy relationships literature coupled with recent findings of sexual self-image 
taking and exchanging and rates of perpetration and victimisation have important 
implications for policy responses and particularly the prevention of retribution-
style IBSA with regard to reducing “victim blaming” and increasing awareness of 
the “unethical and increasingly criminal nature of the non-consensual 
dissemination of a victim’s intimate images. 
2.5. Policing IBSA Challenges: Victim credibility, Victim-blaming, 
Resourcing barriers and Difficulties procuring evidence 
 For many victims of sexual abuse, the police are gatekeepers to the 
criminal justice system (see Spohn & Tellis, 2012). Wentz and Archbold (2012) 
assert the importance of positive police response and support in ensuring that 
victims have fair access to criminal justice. Likewise in IBSA, a form of 
technology-facilitated sexual violence (TFSV) (see Powell & Henry, 2017), the 
police may be the first point of contact for many adult victims which emphasises 
the clear need for police regulation and effective redress for victims (Cooper, 
2016). To date, only two studies have examined the policing of IBSA (Bond & 





police perceptions, responses, experiences and challenges in relation to generic  
cybercrime (Bossler & Holt, 2012; Vincze, 2016). Bond and Tyrrell’s (2018) UK  
national survey of 783 police, reported an overall significant lack of police 
understanding and confidence in investigating, responding to and managing IBSA 
cases whilst Henry et al. (2018) conducted a detailed examination of the nature of 
IBSA, legislative reform, barriers to reporting, jurisdictional challenges, police 
resourcing and stakeholder recommendations through 44 stakeholder semi-
structured interviews with 52 participants. 
 Venema (2016) found that police engage in victim blaming and often fail 
to hold the perpetrator of sexual violence accountable and that victims of marital 
rape (Areh, Mesko, & Umek, 2009) and acquaintance-rape victims (Sleath & 
Bull, 2012) may be subject to more victim blaming than stranger-rape victims. 
The participants in Henry et al. (2018) attributed the underreporting of IBSA, 
inadequate police investigation and ineffective police response to IBSA victims to 
traditional masculine values within the police force, a poor understanding of 
gendered violence, and harm minimisation and victim blaming attitudes held by 
the police. In this study, other factors negatively impacting an IBSA victim’s 
chance of having their case investigated by the police are the victims’ reluctance 
to share their “adult” intimate images (as opposed to illegal child exploitation 
material) with the police out of fear that their images would be construed as 
enjoyable pornographic material by male police officers, fear of retribution by 
offenders if they reported threats of dissemination to the police and fear that their 
circumstances would be trivialised by the police, consistent with the rape 
acceptance myth of “he didn’t mean to” (see Page, 2008a) and, a heightened level 





member of a community (see Dwyer, 2015; Nadal et al., 2011).  
 Police participants in Henry et al.’s (2018) qualitative study also 
highlighted jurisdictional and resourcing barriers which force the police to find a 
more serious offence to investigate, pursue substantive offences such as stalking 
or blackmail in addition to IBSA offences rather than a sole IBSA offence and/or 
investigate cases that have a police protection order in place. This is consistent 
with research by Powell and Henry (2016) which highlighted police prioritisation 
of contact (physical) offences over communication offences or technology-
facilitated harms. 
 Victim credibility is particularly critical in determining whether the police 
would expend effort towards investigating a case, charge the perpetrator 
(Goodman-Delahunty, & Graham, 2011) and refer it to further legal processing 
(Campbell, Menakar, & King, 2015). The perceived lack of victim credibility that 
is guided by police misconceptions about sexual violence has also been cited as a 
key reason for high attrition from the police investigative process (Campbell et al. 
2015). Patterson (2011) argues that if vulnerable victims disclose their 
victimisation and are not believed and blamed for their own victimisation, this 
could re-traumatise and harm them further.  
 In IBSA, victim credibility may be problematic due to technical resource 
constraints encountered by the police in procuring forensic digital evidence (see 
Vincze, 2016) aimed at securing the identity of the individual who created, 
disseminated or threatened to share the victim’s images or evidence supporting a 
“verbal” threat to disseminate a victim’s intimate images. An offender’s 
exploitation of the internet’s anonymity was cited as a major barrier to procuring 





burglary victimisation where the police readily conduct investigations, in cases of  
sexual violence and IBSA victimisation, the onus is unfairly placed on the victim  
to produce the evidence which could initiate police investigation (Henry et al., 
2018). Bond and Tyrell’s (2018) and Henry et al.’s (2018) studies reported poor 
police knowledge of criminal laws and harms of IBSA in addition to the provision 
of unhelpful advice provided to victims of IBSA by the police such as turning off 
their phones or deactivating their social media accounts. Given the present 
findings, combined with literature indicating that victim blaming occurs within 
the police, further research into whether the fact that many staff involved in 
receiving rape or retribution-style IBSA victim reports are male deters victims 
from reporting an offence, or re-traumatises the victim, is an area that would 
benefit from further research.  
 As highlighted by Henry et al. (2018), a further complication for law 
enforcement to assist a victim in accessing the criminal justice system is the fact 
that many victims are unaware that their intimate images are being circulated on 
the internet and may not be aware of the new legislation and be harmed or 
repeatedly harmed but not recognising this as an offence (see Bothamley & Tully, 
2018). This is most applicable to IBSA victims whose perpetrators are not 
motivated by revenge or relationship retribution but by sexual gratification and/or 
to boost social status among a private group. When the victim does not report the 
images, the police cannot take any action.  
 No studies to-date have been conducted on policing IBSA in New 
Zealand. Given that current and former intimate partners are in closest proximity 
to potential IBSA targets, the former are readily presented with opportunities for 





intimate partners are just as if not more capable of committing IBSA than 
individuals outside the intimate relationship space. 
 Understanding literature on retribution-style IBSA offender profiling is 
critical in law enforcement and policy makers’ efforts to review and revise current 
tactical, strategic and/or operational approaches to control and prevent retribution-
style IBSA and on a larger scale, technology-facilitated intimate partner violence. 
Increased knowledge on the “criminal” context of retribution-style IBSA would 
enable law enforcement to police the IPV (dating and domestic) space more 
effectively and take perpetrators to task. As mentioned previously, it would be 
challenging to disrupt crime if it (retribution-style IBSA) is not deemed abusive or 
criminal by the police and third parties who are the first point of contact for 
victims. 
 Indeed broad socio-political or cultural theories and discourse on IBSA 
perpetration and its harmful effects on victims are useful but as a standalone, such 
theoretical perspectives cannot justify the weight of the term image-based 
“sexual” abuse. Although there is no empirically supported typology devised for 
IBSA as a “sexual” abusive crime, the reviewed literature is useful in providing 
more context to the construction of crime scripts of various types of retribution-
style IBSA (e.g., accessing victim’s mobile device, covert filming, blackmail and 
soliciting unwanted sexual favours). These specialised crime scripts are critical in 
enhancing the evidence base for retribution-style IBSA and aiding the 








Chapter 3. Contextualising IBSA: Dating, Domestic and Sexual Violence 
 Central to IBSA is the relationship between the non-consensual creation 
and/or use of private sexual (intimate) images and other forms of sexual violence 
(McGlynn & Rackley, 2016). Referencing Kelly’s (1988, 2012) continuum of 
sexual violence, McGlynn and Rackley (2017) argued that IBSA falls within the 
continuum of sexual violence along with other abusive actions that attack or 
violate a woman’s fundamental rights of sexual identity, expression, integrity and 
autonomy.  
 Researchers have argued the appropriateness of classifying IBSA as a 
sexual offence (Bloom, 2014) rather than a communications offence (i.e., breach 
of privacy) taking into account that the abuse is sexualised as sexual images are 
central to perpetration (McGlynn et al., 2017) and IBSA and sexual assault 
victims share similar negative mental health effects (Bates, 2017). Other 
researchers assert that a wider acceptance of IBSA as a sexual offence would 
ensure that resources are channeled adequately into providing support and 
protection for victims (Strid, Walby, & Armstrong, 2013; Salter & Crofts, 2015; 
McGlynn et al., 2017). Kelly (1988) identifies various harms and tactics used to 
predominantly control women such as abuse, coercion, intimidation, threats, 
intrusion and force that fall along the continuum of sexual violence. Depending on 
the severity of harms associated with IBSA victimisation, IBSA may encompass 
one, more than one or all the aforementioned characteristics. 
 Feminist perspectives of sexual assault or rape outline male domination 
over women as central to the sexual abuse and that such sexual acts are 
rationalised, purposive and goal-driven (i.e., motivated by power and control, 





woman) (Chapleau & Oswald, 2010; Day, 1995; Ellis, 1989; Burt, 1991; Bohner 
et al., 1998) rather than a consequence of pathological (uncontrollable) sexual 
urges or compulsions (Burt, 1980; Lonsway & Fitzgerald, 1995). Priming studies 
have reported that rapists and high risk sex offenders maintain a strong memory 
association between sex and power (see Bargh, Raymond, Pryor, & Strack, 1995; 
Wesselmann, Pryor, & Palmieri, 2002) and this sex-power (dominance) 
association distinguishes rape from sexual acts or activities that are mutually 
consensual with shared power. Chiroro, Bohner, Viki, and Jarvis’s (2004) study 
on rape myth acceptance utilising a survey sample of 310 male participants 
reported that sex was an optimal method for men to exert power over women and 
that being able to dominate a woman through sex is stimulating. When applied to 
IBSA, a former or current male partner who disseminates a woman’s intimate 
images online reaps the “reward power” (Dutton & Goodman, 2005) of 
enjoyment, domination and control over the female victim’s chances of 
employment, familial and social relationships and self-worth and the degree of 
suffering he is able to inflict. 
 Henry and Powell (2016b) also argue that technology expands the 
repertoire of intimate partner violence (IPV) as further abuse can be perpetrated 
via digital media such as monitoring, controlling, threatening, harassing, 
pressuring or coercing a current or former intimate partner (see Reed et al., 2016). 
According to Melander (2010), digital media heightens an intimate partner’s risk 
of public exposure, mockery and degradation and provides ample opportunities 
for unwanted (frequent and/or harmful) digital communications and privacy 
intrusions (covert monitoring and tracking of activities and movements) by an 





Martsolf, 2010; Tokunaga, 2010). Draucker and Martsolf’s (2010) qualitative 
study on young adults established that surveillance behaviours (e.g., phone calls 
and accessing the target’s e-mails and social networking accounts) intensify when 
the perpetrator suspects infidelity and that digital media significantly contributes 
to the escalation of arguments and unwanted prolonged contact between couples 
after separation. In this vein, IBSA was created with the knowledge that the line 
between online and offline sexual violence perpetration and victimisation has 
become increasingly blurred (Bluett-Boyd, Fileborn, Quadara, & Moore, 2013).  
 A large body of research supports the concurrent perpetration of in-the-
flesh IPV behaviours in addition to digital dating abusive behaviours (Marganski 
& Melander, 2018; Ojanen et al., 2015; Brem, Spiller, & Vandehey, 2015; Reed et 
al., 2016). For instance, Reed et al. (2016) measured hypothetical reactions to 
sexting between male and female undergraduates and detected a relationship 
between online dating abuse behaviours and offline physical, sexual, 
psychological perpetration and victimisation. Similarly, Marganski and Melander 
(2018) found that cyber victimisation was a significant predictor of in-the-flesh 
IPV among 540 college students whereby individuals who experienced cyber 
victimisation by an intimate partner were 28 times more likely to experience in-
the-flesh psychological abuse, four times more likely to experience in-the-flesh 
sexual violence and 52 times more likely to experience in-the-flesh physical 
violence by the same partner over a period of 12 months. This literature lends 
support to IBSA perpetration being along the continuum of in-the-flesh IPV. 
3.1. Technology-Facilitated Coercive Control and IBSA Perpetration 
 Stark (2012) defines coercive control as “an ongoing pattern of 





physical and sexual violence with intimidation, sexual degradation, isolation and 
control. The primary outcome of coercive control is a condition of entrapment that 
can be hostage-like in the harms it inflicts on dignity, liberty, autonomy and 
personhood as well as to physical and psychological integrity” (p.6) More 
specifically, coercive tactics are targeted at threatening, intimidating, frightening, 
harming and shaming victims whilst tactics of control are directed at isolating, 
depriving, exploiting and regulating victims. Myhill and Hohl (2016) analysed 
data from risk assessments of coercive control in England and Wales and 
identified that controlling, stalking and sexually coercive behaviours by 
perpetrators and isolation and fear by victims were most salient in intimate partner 
abuse. 
 According to Stark (2007), the closeness present in an intimate 
relationship enables a perpetrator to have privileged access to information about a 
target and identify existing vulnerabilities that are unique to a target and can be 
exploited for incipient IPV or coercive control. For example, a female target may 
have entrusted her intimate images and/or related her conservative upbringing and 
cultural values around nudity and sexual activity to her partner. At a later time, 
during a relationship conflict or separation, he may threaten to disseminate her 
intimate images if she does not re-enter a relationship with him, break-up with her 
new partner or agree to post-breakup unwanted sexual favours.  
 A review by Hamberger, Larsen and Lehrner (2017) identified three 
dimensions of coercive control in an intimate relationship: (i) the perpetrator must 
have the intent and motivation to gain control over the target, (ii) the target must 
perceive the perpetrator’s behaviour as negative, and (iii) the perpetrator must 





Merritt et al., 2010; Day & Bowen, 2015). More comprehensively, the term 
“technology facilitated coercive control” (TFCC) was proposed by Dragiewicz et 
al. (2018) to encompass the technological and relational aspects of abuse in the 
specific context of coercive and controlling intimate (dating and domestic) 
relationships that have an undercurrent of violence. TFCC acknowledges the role 
of digital media in facilitating coercion and controlling behaviours such as 
harassment on social media, cyberstalking via fake social media accounts and 
GPS data, covert intimate filming and phototaking, threats via digital 
communications technologies, monitoring and unauthorised access of a victim’s 
e-mails and social media accounts, falsely impersonating a former or current 
partner, endangering the safety of the individual and threatening to or disclosing 
private information (doxxing) or intimate images of a victim without consent 
(Woodlock, 2017). These researchers emphasise that former or current intimate 
partners exploit the social convergence and ubiquity of digital media by tightening 
control over a victim’s activities, relationships and self-concept and self-worth 
and that physical separation poses little to no inconvenience. Furthermore, 
doxxing could further elevate levels of humiliation and embarrassment for the 
IBSA victim including the potential for online and physical harassment and 
stalking by strangers (Stroud, 2014). 
3.2. Breaking Up is Hard to Do: Relationship Grievances and Resorting to 
Violence 
 Coercive control without physical violence has the capacity to instill fear 
in victims and this can continue after couples have separated (Crossman, 
Hardesty, & Raffaelli, 2016). Separation is perceived as a provocation and 





violence (CCV) (Kelly & Johnson, 2008), hence around the time of separation, 
acts of severe physical, sexual and emotional abuse, harassment, coercive 
controlling behaviours are likely to continue and escalate (Myhill, 2015; Ornstein 
& Rickne, 2013). Post-separation coercive control tactics are also employed by 
divorced men to maintain power and control over their ex-wives (Brownridge, 
Chan, Hiebert-Murphy, & Ristock, 2008; Hayes, 2012; Zeoli, Rivera, Sullivan, & 
Kubiak, 2013). In IBSA, offenders in custody battles may to resort to using a 
victim’s intimate images to gain access to children. As coercive controlling tactics 
are difficult for law enforcement to detect and investigate, this makes it more 
challenging for women or mothers to seek criminal justice or leave an abusive 
relationship with their abusive partners (Bond, 2015). 
 To explain marital separation violence, Sev’er (1997) revised Pence and 
Paymar’s (1993) power and control wheel and highlighted the more salient power 
and control assertion tactics that divorced men use on their ex-wives during or 
after marital separation such as increased intimidation by turning her children and 
other loved ones against her, sabotaging her employment or financial 
independence or exploiting (abusing) the legal system aimed at making her lose 
custody over her children, coercion, threats and actual physical violence. In the 
context of marital separation, coercive control tactics include sexual denigration, 
entitlement and ownership over her (e.g., unfairly criticising his wife’s abilities to 
carry out her domestic and maternal duties) (Pitman, 2017; Velonis, 2016). When 
applied to an ex-husband’s dissemination of his former wife’s intimate images, 
the negative impacts of such IBSA may be experienced differently by married 






3.3. Grievance Escalation Theory and Bypassing Interpersonal Violence 
 Luckenbill and Doyle’s (1989) grievance escalation theory incorporates 
situational aspects of a violent interpersonal interaction complements Felson and 
Steadman’s (1983) situational approach towards disputes leading to criminal 
violence. The grievance escalation theory (Luckenbill & Doyle, 1989) comprises 
three transitional stages to demonstrate how grievances escalate into interpersonal 
violence.  This model can be used to explain IPV or how a female’s intimate 
images get disseminated after a relationship separation. In this model, Stage 1 
(Naming) takes effect when the (male) recipient of a harmful act (relationship 
breakdown or separation) blames the (female) aggressor (who initiated the break-
up or exited the relationship) and holds her personally accountable for the harm 
(insult to his masculine power and authority and her violation of relationship 
rules). At Stage 2 (Claiming), the male recipient of harm demands reparation from 
the (female) aggressor (e.g., relationship reparation or sexual favours) and if that 
is not obtainable (his threats come across as incredulous or she refuses to comply 
with his demands), what follows is an escalation to the final stage which 
embodies the use of force (i.e., the dissemination of her intimate images). 
Luckenbill and Doyle (1989) emphasised that those grievances that escalate into 
violence satisfy two psychological conditions: (i) disputatiousness - the 
willingness to seek revenge and maintain the grievance and, (ii) aggressiveness - 
the belief that violence would solve the problem and that he is willing and 
competent enough to deliver it.  
 Collins (2009, 2013) expanded on Luckenbill and Doyle’s approach by 
including a tipping point between violence and non-violence which includes the 





by the aggressor and target. According to Collins (2009), this emotional tension 
acts as a barrier to violence and the aggressor backs away. However, this stage 
can be bypassed completely. This may be especially pertinent to interpersonal 
crimes perpetrated via digital media such as IBSA as the victim and aggressor are 
typically not in physical contact when threats to disseminate a target’s intimate 
images are made. Collins and Walby (2013) highlights four principle methods to 
bypass emotional/ confrontational tension: (i) selecting a target who is easy to 
dominate and control emotionally, (ii) seeking out and aligning oneself to other 
individuals who provide encouragement and support for perpetrators of violence, 
(iii) maintaining distance when launching weapons of attack without a face-to-
face confrontation with the target and, (iv) adopting a covert tactical approach by 
feigning the absence of conflict until initiating the final attack. According to 
Collins (2013), the first two principle methods are commonly found in 
interpersonal violence and the latter two, perpetrating violence at a distance are 
more relevant to military combat or terrorism (see Dutton, 2012). However, in 
relation to interpersonal crimes in cyberspace or retribution-style IBSA, all four 
principles may apply due to the online disinhibition effect (see Suler, 2004).  
 Exploring the conceptual underpinnings of IPV and the situational 
opportunities/variables that lead to the perpetration of abuse within various 
interpersonal spaces enhances understanding of retribution-style IBSA. The next 









Chapter 4. Crime Theories and Frameworks 
 There are a number of theories relating to the motivation for crime. In this 
chapter, two of these theoretical approaches are outlined, followed by a discussion 
of the framework for offending provided by the Internet.  
4.1. Rational Choice Approach (RCA) 
 Rational choice theories explain how individuals consciously and 
rationally choose to commit criminal acts. Clarke and Cornish (1983, 1986, 2006) 
developed a sophisticated understanding of how individuals make rational choices 
about whether to commit a crime. More specifically, the rational choice theory 
posits that potential offenders make deliberate and goal-directed decisions that 
maximise personal benefits and minimise personal costs (e.g., risk of 
apprehension) when choosing to commit and while committing a crime.  
 Unlike classical ideologies of the rational choice theory that aim to 
ascertain the degree of rationality attributed to criminal activities, Clarke and 
Cornish (1983) emphasise that decisions to commit crimes need not be completely 
rational or carefully calibrated. Instead, offenders vary in their perceptions, 
attitudes, motivations, skills and abilities to analyse a situation and conduct choice 
structuring (weighing of benefits and costs) in order to achieve favourable 
outcomes (Cornish & Clarke, 1987). Hence, regardless of the type, frequency or 
severity of crime, offending decisions are considered deliberate and goal-directed 
(see Brantingham & Brantingham, 1978; Clarke & Cornish, 1985; Walsh, 1978; 
Cusson, 1983) rather than senseless even in criminal cases where clinical 
delusions (symptomatic of psychotic episodes) or pathological compulsive 
behaviours are valid reasons for offending (Cornish & Clarke, 2006). Clarke and 





decisions take into account the environment of opportunities that facilitate 
criminal activity and constraints that prohibit crime. When applied to IBSA 
perpetration by former or current partners, offending arises out of an offender’s 
assessment of perceived risks and efforts involved in perpetrating retribution-style 
IBSA and the expected rewards (e.g., revenge, power, sexual gratification, money, 
unwanted sexual favours) (Cornish & Clarke, 2008).  
 Einstadter and Henry (2006) introduced the term “bounded rationality” to 
explain how an offender arrives at an acceptable decision. Instead of considering 
the maximisation or optimisation of outcomes (cost-benefit analysis), offenders 
make quick decisions at a given time period based on personal schema or scripts 
of past success. Similarly, Clarke (2008) argues that offenders are making 
decisions even if the decisions are split-second made and that offender decision-
making is dynamic-- an offender’s readiness varies according to his/her current 
personal goals and frequent self-evaluations of their involvement in criminal 
activity and prior involvement in similar activities and the extent that the offender 
has learned from the consequences.  
 Cornish and Clarke (2008) support the use of the rational choice 
perspective as a heuristic for developing crime control strategies rather than a 
theory. Also, this perspective shifts the focus away from the origins of criminal 
behaviour and “criminal” personality traits (Waldo & Dinitz, 1967) to offender 
decision-making and the crime event or crime-commission process. Offender 
decision-making and behaviour can only be analysed if a crime is specific and 
contextualised (e.g., IBSA perpetration by former or current partners versus IBSA 
perpetration by strangers). In the context of retribution-style IBSA perpetration, 





on the interaction of the offender with the immediate environment, the role of 
opportunity and situational variables and implement crime controls such as 
increasing the risks and efforts involved and disrupting criminal actions by 
reducing rewards associated with retribution-style IBSA perpetration. 
4.2. Routine Activities Theory (RAT) 
 Cohen and Felson’s (1979) Routine Activities Theory (RAT), a subsidiary 
of rational choice theory takes into consideration situational factors that influence 
offenders to choose to commit crimes. Like the RCA, RAT assumes that 
offenders are rational and hedonistic. The RAT posits that criminal opportunities 
arise when there is a convergence of time and space of a (i) motivated offender, 
(ii) suitable target, and (iii) a lack of capable guardianship. Without this 
convergence of daily routine activities, direct-contact crime between the offender 
and victim cannot occur.  
 The Internet and digital media have been identified as conducive 
environments for the convergence of motivated offenders and suitable targets in 
the absence or lack of capable guardianship (Holt & Bossler, 2013; Grabosky & 
Smith, 2001). The convergence between cyber criminals and cyber victims occurs 
through digital communications devices and platforms rather than in physical time 
and space (Holt & Bossler, 2013). Felson and Clarke (2010) provided examples of 
characteristics and/or behaviours that render targets attractive and suitable to 
offenders such as social activities, economic status and drug and alcohol use. 
Although no studies to date have utilised RAT to solely explain the non-
consensual dissemination of intimate images by former or current adult intimate 
partners, some research has identified variables that make victims attractive. For 





perpetrators and victims, having more computer skills was a significant predictor 
of a general measure of cybercrime perpetration and victimisation. When applied 
to retribution-style IBSA, a level of technological competency is required to 
utilise a smartphone camera and image-sharing platforms or mobile applications 
to engage in sexual self-image taking and sharing (sexting).  
 Research by Marganski and Melander (2018) and a review by Chen, Ho 
and Lwin (2017) identified risky online behaviours such as disseminating 
passwords as significant in increasing a target’s exposure to motivated offenders. 
Although both studies did not explicitly measure retribution-style IBSA 
victimisation, due to an intimate couple’s routine activities, intimate partners may 
have more opportunities to access a target’s mobile device or personal computer 
folders and download, store and later disseminate a target’s intimate images. 
Reyns, Henson and Fisher (2011) applied RAT to predict undergraduate student 
cyber harassment (stalking) victimisation and found that being female and being 
in an intimate relationship predicted cyber harassment victimisation and not 
online exposure variables commonly associated with cyber victimisation. Overall, 
there is limited RAT empirical support for generic cyber offending and 
victimisation with the exception of visibility.  
 According to Felson (1995), a motivated offender refers to physical 
(socio-environmental) factors rather than criminal disposition or motivation to 
commit a crime. Similar to the RCA, Felson and Clarke (1998) emphasise the 
importance of other important aspects of crime for more effective crime 
prevention to supplement other analyses aimed at deciphering the purposes and 
capacities of the aggressor in relation to intrinsic characteristics of potential 





target from crime. These can take various forms such as online platforms’ front-
end, user-facing features and back-end architectures and algorithms (Suzor et al., 
2017), women’s advocates and agencies that have developed their own initiatives 
to promote women’s online safety and encourage participation online (see 
Dragiewicz et al., 2018), search engines’ and social media platforms’ removal of 
revenge porn links from search results that have been reported (Singhal, 2015; 
Suzor et al., 2017) and individual advice on how online platforms can enhance 
their settings to protect victims of online abuse (e.g., Harper, 2016). However, 
these online platforms’ technologies have been criticised for lack of opaqueness, 
inconsistent and contradictory enforcement (Gillespie, 2017; Salter, 2017a; Suzor, 
Van Geelen, & West, 2018).  
 McMahon and Banyard (2012) have demonstrated that on college 
campuses, capable guardians are likely to be present before, during or after 
incidents of sexual assault and intimate partner violence. Other researchers have 
reported that college students are more willing to intervene if they know the 
victim (Burn, 2009; Casey & Ohler, 2012, Bennet & Banyard, 2016; Palmer, 
Nicksa, & McMahon, 2018). However, there is minimal research on the 
relationship between capable guardians, and perpetrators of sexual assault with 
the exception of a recent study that found that college capable guardians were less 
willing to report sexual assault if it were perpetrated by a friend (Nicksa, 2014). 
Situational variables such as relational distance and the degree of involvement in 
other people’s lives influence perpetration (Black, 1976). These situational 
variables could also be significant in the context of online forms of interpersonal 
violence or IPV. 





sexting coercive behaviours, these behaviours are typically conducted in private, 
indoors and in isolated locations and are at times part of a series of attacks by the 
same intimate partner (threats to disseminate intimate images) may go unnoticed 
by capable guardians. The unregulated/ poorly regulated nature of the online 
environment and the intimate relationship space create a lack/ absence of capable 
guardianship over the use of harmful digital communications and cyber-
technology that increase opportunities for a motivated offender to harass or abuse 
an intimate partner. There has also been limited research on the impact of 
guardianship (female rape resistance strategies) on sex offending (Ullman, 2007) 
especially guardian intervention in different situational contexts (Hart & Miethe, 
2008). The most recent examination of sexual offences perpetrated against women 
by acquaintances (i.e., non-stranger offenders previously known to the victim) 
was conducted by Chiu and Leclerc (2017). These researchers utilised the RCA 
and crime script framework to devise intervention points at each crime script 
stage. However, to date, no prevention studies have been conducted on 
retribution-style IBSA. 
 Targets can be humans or property but in order for a potential offender to 
select a “suitable” target, the target must more or less satisfy the criteria in the 
acronym, VIVA (value, inertia, visibility and access) created by Cohen and 
Felson (1979). A target is deemed suitable if it (human or property) is valuable 
(real or symbolic) to the offender, transportable (lightweight and not bulky or odd 
shaped), visible (vulnerable to exposure or proximity to contact and attack) and 
accessible (the environment is conducive for carrying out an attack). Although 
VIVA was originally designed for property crimes (e.g., theft) and predatory 





cyber crime (Grabosky & Smith, 2001; Holt & Bossler, 2013). Inertia was 
identified as least relevant not to cybercrime (Yar, 2005) whilst other elements 
such as value, visibility and accessibility are significant (Yar, 2005; Miró, 2012, 
2015; Leufeldt & Yar, 2016).  
 Clarke’s (1999) CRAVED framework was proposed as a revision of 
Cohen and Felson’s (1979) VIVA heuristic. It was designed specifically for theft 
of “hot” products and includes more dimensions (i.e., Concealable, Removable, 
Available, Valuable, Enjoyable, and Disposable) in the suitable targets checklist 
(CRAVED; Petrossian and Clarke, 2014). Petrossian and Clarke (2014) 
emphasised the utility of this framework to specific and contextualised types of 
crimes. Concealable- targets that are harder to identify and can be concealed more 
easily are more likely to be selected by offenders. Removable- targets that can be 
easily transported are more likely to be selected by offenders. Available- an 
inanimate object or a victim has to be visible and accessible. Valuable- valuable 
products (intimate images) are more likely to be targeted by offenders of IBSA. 
Enjoyable- IBSA offenders will select products that can bring them pleasure (e.g., 
a victim’s intimate images with identifiable features) over other things of similar 
value (victim’s non-intimate images). Disposable- IBSA offenders would need to 
be careful to select targets that are unwilling to and incapable of taking legal 
action or reporting the matter to the police. Victims must be easily controlled, 
harmed and humiliated enough to be disposable (i.e., not obligated to keep 
target’s intimate images private as both offender and target are no longer in an 
intimate relationship). 
4.3. Digital Architecture: Creating Opportunities for IBSA 





still a real space where people use the Internet for communications and 
interactions (Kellerman, 2016) and crimes perpetrated in cyberspace have real 
consequences in the real world (Newman, 2009). However, there are clear 
differences in how individuals communicate and interact in physical space and in 
cyber space (Yar, 2005; Leukfeldt and Yar, 2016).  Miró (2012) asserts that these 
clear differences stemming from ICT’s impact have significant implications for 
how crime is understood and prevented in cyberspace (Capeller, 2001; Grabosky, 
2001; Pease, 2001). However, the non-consensual dissemination of intimate 
images is better understood as technology-facilitated interpersonal violence 
whereby new electronic technologies (e.g., smart phones and computers) are 
utilised to perpetuate acts of intimate partner violence (IPV) (Dixon & Bowen, 
2012; Melander, 2010).  
 Using the rational choice perspective, Wortley (2008) posits that the 
immediate environment can encourage or induce individuals who would not have 
contemplated crime in the first place to commit crime. In other words, the 
environment can precipitate criminal behaviour. This can be better explained 
using four precipitators: prompts, pressures, permission and provocations 
(Wortley, 2008). When applied to retribution-style IBSA perpetration, prompts 
could represent the storing of digital images in an offender’s phone, scrolling 
through the image folders storing the victim’s intimate images, viewing and 
consuming the images for pleasure or attempting to track the victim’s 
whereabouts and activities. Pressures could include peer pressure from others 
asking if the offender has his former or current partner’s intimate images or 
pressure to re-establish patriarchal order. Permission include weakening moral 





on alcohol problems. Examples of provocations could be relationship 
breakdowns, (actual or perceived) infidelity or the former partner has moved on. 
4.3.1. Ease of interactions  
 Researchers have identified the ease of interactions in cyberspace 
otherwise described as the contraction of distance and freedom to occupy and 
utilise multiple online spaces simultaneously (Grabosky, 2001; Hutchings & 
Hayes, 2009). Through electronic technologies and digital media, individuals 
have the ability to interact with one and many people simultaneously with ease 
and these variables have the potential of multiplying the effect of criminal 
opportunities that has no precedent in history or real life crimes (Clough, 2010).  
 Researchers (Bernasco, 2018; Brantingham & Brantingham, 1984) have 
demonstrated that physical crime in urban areas often occurs in proximity of the 
offender’s residence due to constraints of movement (e.g., additional transport 
costs) and their heightened awareness of opportunities in their area of residence 
rather than further away. Zipf’s (1949) principle of least effort (see Hollingshead 
and Zipf, 1949) can be applied to cyber crimes as well. In the context of cyber 
space (as opposed to urban crime), the role that geographical distance plays in the 
choices available to offenders and physical costs is less significant (Brenner & 
Clarke, 2005; Jones, 2007; McQuade, 2006; Miró 2012). This facilitates 
opportunities to offend in cyber space. Jaishankar (2008) who proposed the space 
transition theory argues that cybercrimes have unique causes compared to crimes 
that occur in physical spaces. 
 In cyber space, language barriers and cultural differences appear to play an 
ambivalent role in offending. In the context of digital communications, cultural 





However, in the context of retribution-style IBSA, where explicit images rather 
than words are used, cultural differences and language barriers may have 
minimum effect on reducing opportunities for offending. Moreover, the removal 
of these constraints by allowing “images” to speak for themselves makes for 
effortless offending and could multiply the harm inflicted on the victim. The 
accessibility, retention, reach and replicability of content in digital media (Baym, 
2015) enable text (i.e., cases of doxxing) and media objects (IBSA) to be utilised 
in the abuse and be persistently visible and tied to the victim’s identity. Bates’ 
(2017) interviews with victims of non-consensual dissemination of intimate 
images explained the constant anxiety victims experience over where and when 
their images would next appear. 
 A physical crime committed by a single person is limited to one place at a 
time. Unfortunately, on the internet, a single individual can upload a victim’s 
intimate images on as many platforms as possible and circulate them to as many 
people as they want regardless of geographical location or spatial boundaries 
(Woodlock, 2017). A single act of non-consensual dissemination of intimate 
images on the internet means that the act can be more easily multiplied through 
the process of diffusion in cyberspace, with other internet users distributing or 
consuming the victim’s explicit content without the offender’s instruction or 
participation (see Nazario, 2004).  
4.3.2. Perception of Time  
 The Internet affects how time influences activity (Lee & Liebenau, 2000). 
The contraction of space (distance) reduces the time needed for social 
communication and interactions (Kitchin, 1998) and accelerates the subjective 





digital media enhances the sense of placenessness and makes communications 
more immediate and personal, magnifying the harms of abuse (Baym, 2015). 
Types of communication in online spaces can make communicative expressions 
more persistent. Cyberspace increases an offender’s capacity to control how long 
communications or actions persist resulting in victims constantly feeling unsafe 
and unable to stop the spread of their images and escape from the abuse even 
though they are no longer in contact with the offender (Dimond, Fiesler, & 
Bruckman, 2011).  
4.3.3. Perception of Transnational Boundaries 
 The absence of a central authority or the blurring of borders on the Internet 
and digital media create opportunities for offending. Countries need to 
collectively exercise authority in cyberspace as a single country’s legislation is 
often inadequate in controlling the non-consensual dissemination of intimate 
images. There are also significant challenges in regulating the Internet (Hiller & 
Cohen, 2002) and the lack of international legal structures to consistently and 
thoroughly enforce the removal of abusive material complicates the prosecution of 
the non-consensual dissemination of intimate images online (Citron & Franks, 
2014; Salter & Crofts, 2015). Business models of online intermediaries or digital 
media platforms also work against victims. For instance, hate generated or 
circulated online (e.g., wider networks of misogyny) improve traffic to the media 
or online content, communications and interactions about it. The skyrocketing of 
viewership and/or reviews boost economic revenue for these platforms could 
explain their lackluster performance in responding to online abuse (Langlois & 






requests. These systemic loopholes translate to opportunities that can be exploited 
by offenders. 
4.3.4. Dynamic and Rapidly Changing Perceptions of Online Behaviour  
 According to Goodman and Brenner (2002), perceptions of what is 
deemed socially and/or legally acceptable on the Internet are ambiguous. For 
instance, changes initiated by users (e.g., flagging or reporting certain nude 
images and not others) or what is considered normative is subject to change and is 
unclear especially since the boundary between public and private seems to have 
shifted from one of censorship to an informed consumer culture, better explained 
as pornographication (Attwood, 2009), the mainstreamification of pornography 
(Empel, 2012) and the sexualisation of culture Western societies (Dines, 2010). 
Offenders can also exploit public perceptions of victim blaming and slut shaming 
(Salter, 2017a) similar to public rape endorsement of statements such as “Women 
who are raped ask for it” or “Most rapists are oversexed” (see Longsway & 
Fitzgerald, 1994). 
4.3.5. Contact Online is “Indirect” and Often “Anonymous”  
 Cyberspace changes how people interact, the perceived and actual risks 
associated with offending and getting caught, and the likely effectiveness of the 
actions of guardians who might attempt to make offending more difficult. 
Anonymity can provide offenders with a sense of safety and reduce their fear of 
getting caught (Pittaro, 2007). Utilising online privacy platforms such as The 
Onion Router (Tor) enables offenders to control how much of their information is 
available and therefore conceal their crimes from law enforcement and others 
known to the victim. Yar (2005) identified other ways offenders remain 





identities and adopting multiple virtual personalities through multiple accounts 
which they consecutively or simultaneously utilise to offend. This could be a 
technique for criminally sophisticated IBSA perpetrators. Other Internet or digital 
media users can displace responsibility as they did not hurt the female in the 
image. Instead, they would rationalise their consumption behaviours (i.e., 
viewing, masturbating to and circulating intimate images) by claiming that the 
content was publicly available and therefore meant for sexual arousal of a public 
audience (Whisnant, 2010). 
4.3.6. Online Disinhibition Effect 
 Researchers have argued that habitual Internet users experience the 
disinhibition effect which leads them to verbalise or engage in behaviours that 
they would not normally partake in during face-to-face interactions (Jaishankar, 
2008; Agustina, 2012). In devising his psychology of cyberspace model, Suler 
(2004) identified six elements in the virtual environment that contribute to internet 
users’ collapse of healthy psychological barriers that control and regulate hostile 
feelings, and other feelings and needs or online disinhibition effect. 
 The first element is dissociative anonymity which outlines an individual’s 
separation of online and offline activities, forming two distinct identities that do 
not overlap. The second element is invisibility which relates to the fact that 
individuals are able to secretly or privately access websites and chat rooms that 
they otherwise would never partake in for fear of shame, apprehension and 
damage to their own reputation. The third element is asynchronicity in which 
interactions are not necessarily produced in real time. Interactions can be 
regulated according to an individual’s construction and revision of his/her online 





impulsivity and hostility, otherwise termed as an ‘emotional hit and run’. The 
forth element is solipsistic introjection which refers to a subject assigning 
imaginary traits to the other party he/she is interacting with to compensate for the 
absence or lack of reliable data on the other party. These fantasies of the 
imagination can also spill over into real life although these fantasies are 
considerably unregulated online. The fifth element is dissociative imagination 
which refers to the conscious or unconscious perception that the self-constructed 
imaginary characters (i.e., the digital self along with the personas of others online) 
exist in a separate dimension and are devoid of demands and responsibilities in 
real life. This element involves dissociation between the fictional online world 
and the facts of real offline life. The sixth element is the minimisation of status 
and authority on the internet which refers to internet users losing distinctive 
attributes of their authority and status which would otherwise be significantly 
pronounced in the real world and lead to social distancing.  
 According to Agustina (2015), these online disinhibition effects increase 
Internet users’ susceptibility to engage in risky online behaviours which could end 
up in cyber victimisation. More specifically relating to IBSA, Reynes, Burek, 
Henson, & Fisher (2013) argue that sexting significantly predicts eventual forms 
of cyber victimisation such as extortion, blackmail, vengeful or frivolous actions 
(Agustina, 2012). However, sexting may not be an online risk taking behaviour in 
contexts where IBSA is perpetuated by former or current long term committed 
intimate (abusive) partners. This elevates the level of complexity in explaining 
and preventing victimisation in the context of “not-so-naive” IBSA adult victims 






 Central to this study is the CRAVED framework which would largely 
assist with the operationalising of IBSA behaviours which can assist with 
streamlining police investigations and facilitating retribution-style IBSA victims’ 
fair access to the criminal justice system. The operationalising of IBSA 
behaviours would expand the limited quantitative crime data on IBSA. Moreover, 
in worst-case scenarios whereby serious emotional distress has been inflicted on 
the victim, the perpetrator appears undeterred and the spread of the damage is 
extensive (see Section 22 of HDCA), swift action by the police is of paramount 
importance. Chapter 5 would elaborate on data collection methods, crime 
analytical approaches (i.e., CRAVED, crime script analysis and thematic analysis), 
and IBSA crime prevention frameworks (i.e., crime intervention points and 


















Chapter 5. Method and Analysis 
 Unlike conventional Crime Science research, this study sought to combine 
secondary data and primary data given that quantitative crime data is limited and 
that the research in this area is still in its infancy. Using two data sources enables 
triangulation which enables retribution-style IBSA to be examined more closely 
and identify unexpected contradictions and insights. 
5.1. Understanding the Crime-Commission Process of Retribution-style IBSA  
5.1.1. Participants  
4 participants from an intermediary in New Zealand that specialises in providing 
practical support to IBSA and other Harmful Digital Communications victims 
were recruited based on criterion and snowball sampling. The purpose of these 
interviews was to capture more accurately the IBSA cases that are not reported to 
and/or investigated by the police. 
5.1.2. Materials and Procedure 
For primary data collection, a semi-structured interview format was adhered to. 
(Refer to Appendix B). For secondary data collection, 18 court transcripts that 
were publicly released by The District Court of New Zealand under the search 
category of Harmful Digital Communications Offences were utilised. Court 
transcripts that did not explicitly reference a victim’s intimate images being used 
in the IBSA perpetration were excluded from the study. IBSA perpetrated by 
acquaintances with no prior romantic or sexual relationship with the victim and 
technology-facilitated adult sexual offences involving minors and child 
pornography content were also excluded. The transcripts were reviewed to ensure 
none of them overlapped. The interviews were administered over the course of 





on each day and took place at the workplaces of the participants. Each interview 
took no longer than 60 minutes. The interviewees were asked to respond to 
questions in 3 main sections: (i) Offender, Victim and Bystander Profiling, (ii) 
Crime Opportunities and Situational Variables in Cyberspace, (iii) Five specific 
research domains (i.e., the continuum of intimate partner violence in real life and 
in the virtual space, concepts of harm and victim blaming, the gendered nature of 
IBSA, possible ways to deter offenders- prevent IBSA and, how bystanders can 
intervene safely and effectively). A debrief followed this. All interviews were 
audio recorded with the participants’ consent. The interviews were transcribed 
and the participants were given two weeks to review and revise their transcripts. 
In order to protect the confidentiality of participants and victims of IBSA, 
participants were allocated alphabets and all identifying data was removed from 
the results. The Human Research Ethics Committee of the Faculty of Arts and 
Social Sciences, University of Waikato approved the collection of interview data 
for this study.  
5.1.3. Content Analysis of Court Transcripts 
 Qualitative analysis, particularly content analysis has been employed by 
researchers to categorise crime data into scripts for organised and interpersonal 
crimes (see Chi, Leclerc, & Townsley, 2011; Chi & Leclerc, 2017). According to 
Porter (2008), archival court data cites multiple sources of evidence such as 
offender, witness and victim statements and forensic evidence and collectively, 
these have been subject to strict legal examination or fact checking. Citing 
multiple sources makes court data more credible and reliable than data gathered 
from a single source (e.g., victim or offender interviews or surveys) which are 





public, this suggests that care has been taken by the Courts to maintain 
confidentiality of protected parties, namely victims of IBSA. Cornish and Clarke 
(2002) also emphasise the dynamic nature of crimes and the need for crime scripts 
to be progressive and be constantly revised to keep pace with increased criminal 
and technical sophistication of crimes. The ease and affordability of court data 
enable researchers of technology-facilitated intimate partner violence to meet the 
increasing demand for an evidence base in support of the HDCA and prevention 
of IBSA. This study is a partial replication of work by Chi and Leclerc (2017) 
which utilised content analysis to investigate and propose intervention points for 
sexual offences by acquaintances.  
5.1.4. Crime Script Analysis of Court Transcripts 
 Cornish (1994) developed combined the concept of rational choice and 
cognitive scripts and introduced a systematic methodology of analysing crimes. 
Crime scripts represent the complete sequence of actions required to initiate and 
complete specific crimes. Crime script analysis systematically investigates all 
crime stages: Preparation, Entry, Pre-condition, Instrumental precondition, 
Instrumental initiation, Instrumental actualisation, Doing, Post-condition, and 
Exit. This structure enables a detailed analysis of a specific crime’s crime-
commission process including offender decisions and actions and the resources 
employed in the successful completion of a crime. Crime script analysis is best 
applied to understand specific rather than generic crimes and identify intervention 
points for situational prevention. To systematically and thoroughly investigate 
“intimate partner abuse” in IBSA perpetrated by former or current intimate 
partners, this study would employ Leclerc, Wortley and Smallbone’s (2011) child 





initiation, instrumental initiation (continuation), instrumental initiation 
(continuation), instrumental actualisation, completion, outcomes and post 
condition used in An additional stage, offender-victim prehistory (see Chiu & 
Leclerc, 2017) would be added to provide some contextual background to the 
IBSA perpetration types. 
5.1.5. CRAVED to Predict Type of Victim Targeted by Offenders 
 CRAVED (Clarke, 1999) would be applied to the court transcripts and 
interviews to guide the examination of the type of victim or images targeted by 
current or former intimate partners who perpetrator IBSA and inform crime script 
intervention points. To date, CRAVED has not been applied to qualitative data. 
Previous research by Beuregard and Martineau (2015) applied CRAVED to the 
choice of victim in sexual homicide. Using the sexual preference hypothesis by 
Abel et al. (1987), the researchers sought to apply CRAVED to demonstrate that 
sexual murderers share similar characteristics with property offenders. This was 
further supported by Felson’s (2002) support of CRAVED being applied to human 
targets of predatory and sexual crimes. Felson (2002) explains that a violent 
offender needs to conceal the criminal act in addition to the steps preceding and 
following it, remove himself from the crime scene, locate a convenient and 
valuable human target to launch an attack, enjoy the criminal act or avoid getting 
hurt in the process and dispose of incriminating evidence, including the victim. 
Although it is not possible to physically dispose of a target of IBSA, the negative 
consequences of victim blaming after the victim’s intimate images are non-
consensually disseminated could result in isolation and deter the victim from 






5.2. Prevention of Retribution-style IBSA 
5.2.1. Thematic Analysis of Interviews 
 Thematic analysis is a useful method for gathering valuable insights from 
participants and investigating similarities and differences in perspectives across 
participant responses (Braun & Clarke, 2006; King, 2004). Most importantly, it 
can be useful for producing qualitative analyses appropriate for informing policy 
development and improvement.  
5.2.2. Situational Crime Prevention Approach 
 Cornish and Clarke’s (2003) Situational Crime Prevention (SCP) approach 
utilises 25 techniques that orientate police efforts in managing, designing and 
manipulating the immediate physical environment to reduce crime opportunities 
and prevent concrete crime phenomena. However, other researchers have applied 
SCP techniques to virtual environments (Reynes, 2010) in addition to other 
instruments tailored towards preventing cyber crime such as cyberstalking, 
grooming, and online child pornography (Wortley & Smallbone, 2012). 
According to SCP, there are five main ways to modify a situation to reduce crime 
opportunities: (i) increasing the effort required for an offender to carry out a 
crime, (ii) increasing the risks the offender must face in completing the crime, (iii) 
reducing the rewards or benefits the offender expects to obtain from the crime, 
(iv) reducing or avoiding provocations that may tempt or incite offenders into 
criminal acts, and (v) removing excuses that offenders may use to rationalise or 
justify their actions. The 20 types of situational crime prevention measures for 
cyber-criminality by Miró (2012) would be used to guide the SCP of IBSA, a 
technology-facilitated crime as opposed to pure cyber crime (crime that takes 






5.2.3. Crime Script Intervention Points 
 Although Cornish (1994) developed crime scripts for the purpose of 
matching situational crime prevention strategies to stages in crime-commission 
process, a few studies have used the crime script framework directly to identify 
intervention points where crime opportunities can be disrupted and risks of 
offending can be increased (e.g., Clarke & Newman, 2006; Chi et al., 2011; 
Leclerc et al., 2011; Chiu & Leclerc, 2017). Chiu and Leclerc (2017) conducted a 
crime script analysis and devised intervention points for sexual offences 
perpetrated against women by acquaintances which has been identified as the 
most common type of sexual violence perpetrated against women (Myhill & 
Allen, 2002). Given the similarities between acquaintance perpetrated sex 
offending against women and IBSA perpetrated by former and current adult 
intimate partners, Chiu and Leclerc’s (2017) work would be used in this study 
including the research objectives: understanding the crime stages involved in 
IBSA perpetration by former and current intimate partners and applying 
situational crime prevention measures to disrupt the crime-commission process of 














Chapter 6. Understanding the Crime-Commission Process of Retribution-
style IBSA 
 
 Among retribution-style IBSA prosecutions, women comprised the 
majority of victims whilst men comprised the majority of perpetrators. 
Retribution-style IBSA appears to be present in different relationship contexts and 
circumstances.  
Results 
6.1. Content Analysis of Court Transcripts for IBSA  
Table 1 
Content Analysis of Court Transcripts 
Variables Categories 
Social elements 
Actors involved Offender, victim, co-offenders, third parties (victim’s children; 





Partner, ex-partner and victim’s parent (Mother disapproves 
relationship, offender sends partner’s mother a sex video of her 
daughter)  
 
Circumstances Relationship status: Separated, in the process of separating 
Type of relationship: Committed partner, casual sex partner 
and cheating partner (see Drouin, Vogel, Surbey, & Stills, 
2013). “Cheating” is unclear in context of marital separation 
and victim is spending time with new “male” friend 
Relationship length: several months, 1 year, more than a couple 
of years, approximately 7 years, approximately 10 years, 10+ 
years 
Children: has biological children together, children living with 
victim or offender either part-time or full-time 
Cohabitation status: once lived together, separated residences, 
unclear 
Other: Extramarital affair (husband concealing marriage from 
ex-girlfriend and infidelity from wife), on-off relationship 
Met online: 1 case 
Met offline: 17 




Confrontation Wanted to reconcile with, patch up failed relationship with 




and moved on to ex-partner’s friend, threatened with images if 
ex-partner did not stop contact 
Surprise Possesses/ still possesses intimate images of victim/ kept  
images not withstanding victim’s constant requests that 
offender deletes them, non-consensual and consensually taken 




Blackmail while soliciting unwanted sexual favours from 
victim 
Intimate covert filming (Crimes Act 1961) 
Covert surveillance by installing smart phone monitoring and 
control app on victim’s mobile device without victim’s 
authorisation or accessing victim’s Google Maps account  
Physical stalking 
Accessing victim’s mobile device, accessing victim’s social 
media account directly from mobile device or through victim’s 
e-mail account and password  
 
Blitz Victim’s intimate images (self-taken and shared with offender 
before meeting in-the-flesh and getting into a relationship and 
during relationship, phone and webcam videos) 
Victim’s face fully identifiable in nude/ semi-nude images, 
close-up images of genitalia and intimate visual recordings of 
victim engaging in sexual acts e.g., oral sexual activity and 
sexual intercourse 
Victim’s personal details (e.g., address, phone number 
Internet (various online platforms) 
Digital communications (work-based website or social media 
page or page of significant corporation) 
 
Setting 
Location Online platforms/ digital communications/ digital media/ 
smartphones 
 
More than one 
crime scene 
Yes/ No 
Time Daylight, darkness 
 
Interaction 
Victim reaction Resistance, ignoring offender, carry out sexual requests of ex-




Used threats, ignored victim’s pleas not to disclose images, 
refused to delete victim’s intimate images, blackmail, 
negotiation, ceased to demand, posting image on victim’s 
social media account Timeline (private settings) or sending 
image via instant messenger (IM) to victim’s family (e.g., son 
or daughter – can be minors, mother etc.,), repeated uploading 
of intimate visual recordings, no informing victim of intention 








Disclosing content to a specific target audience (victim’s 
closest family or friends- usually 1-2 individuals) 
Disclosing content to a larger audience (victim’s friends or 
public) using multiple platforms 
Disclosing personal information e.g., direct reference to name, 
mobile phone number, e-mail  
Attaching a price tag “$1” to each image (advertising victim’s 
body for sexual services) 
Disclosing victim’s intimate video recordings on pornography 
site 
Offensive labelling of images or video footage (e.g., “Dirty 
whore” and “Slut begs for it in the arse”) 
 
Other variables 
Disruption Third party intervened/ disrupted, victim sought help before 
images were posted 
 
Exit Offender and victim stopped virtual and offline contact 
 
Threats/ force Verbal threats used (in-the-flesh and digital communications) 
 
Tools/ transport None 
 
Post-action Conceal/ delete digital evidence/ attempts to reconcile with 
victim 
 
Other Potential ‘triggers’ (date/ sexual advance rejection, prior 
relationship break-up), prior alcohol and drug problems or 
convictions (e.g., driving dangerously or driving with access 
breath alcohol), prior history of domestic violence or 
convictions (e.g., male assaults female, breach of protection 
order), mental health problems (e.g., self-harm, substance 
abuse/ addiction) 
 
• Note: The term ‘trigger’ refers to factors or offender-victim prehistory that 
may result in the offender being in a heightened emotional state (e.g., 
stress/anger), and is not intended to imply causality 
• Some cases when the victim is the recipient (e.g., mother did not approve 
of the relationship. He sent daughter’s sexual video to mother. Does not 
know mother personally. 
 
 There are five main types of IBSA perpetrated by current or former 
intimate partners, threats to disseminate images, dissemination of images with or 
without threats, extorting unwanted sexual favours from a victim (sextortion), 





activity, and unauthorised access of a victim’s mobile device and disseminating 
the victim’s images using the victim’s mobile device. Three crime scripts have  
been devised: threats, sextortion and dissemination (Fig 1.1), unauthorised access 
of victim’s mobile device and dissemination (Fig 1.2), and covert intimate filming 
(Fig 1.3).  







Figure 1.1. Image-based sexual abuse crime script: Threats, Sextortion and 
Dissemination of victim’s intimate images (victim shared images with offender)  
Source: Adapted from Leclerc, Wortley, and Smallbone, 2011 
  
 1. Offender-victim prehistory 
 The most common retribution-style IBSA occurs in the context of a former 
 intimate relationship, followed by a current intimate relationship. The 
 majority of cases involved intimate images that were consensually taken 
 by the victim and/or offender, with another case involving unauthorised 
 retention of the victim’s intimate images when the offender was instructed 
 by the victim to delete them, a couple of cases of covert filming and 
 screenshots during webcam sexual activity.  
 2. Entry to Setting (circumstances, location, time, third parties) 
 Threats, Sextortion and Dissemination of victim’s intimate images: The 
 setting in which the victim is first encountered can be in the physical or 
 virtual space. More commonly, the setting used would be the virtual space 
 such as social media platforms and/or the offender’s own mobile device 
 with stored intimate images of their former or current partner.  
 Unauthorised Access of Victim’s Mobile Device and Dissemination: The 
 setting is the physical place where the victim leaves his/her mobile phone 
 unattended and/or unlocked and stores their intimate images. This enables 
 the offender to access the victim’s images with little resistance.  
 Covert Intimate Filming “Voyeurism”: This can be a physical and private 






 absent. The virtual space is relevant in cases involving private webcam 
 sessions with the victim. 
 3. Instrumental initiation 
 Threats and Dissemination of victim’s intimate images: Confrontations are 
 typically initiated by the offender (former or current intimate partner) with 
 the purpose of repairing a broken relationship, soliciting unwanted sexual 
 favours from the victim, regulating a former or current partner’s 
 relationships and activities or  creating discord between parent and child. In 
 one case, the victim confronted the former partner (offender) about his 
 initiation of a break up and his decision to move on to date her friend. The 
 offender retaliated with threats to disseminate her intimate images if she 
 interfered in his new intimate relationship. In other cases, there were no 
 clear confrontations after the break-up or threats to disseminate a victim’s 
 intimate images and hence, this can be labeled as contemplating 
 dissemination. 
 Unauthorised Access of Victim’s Mobile Device and Dissemination: This 
 would be the planning phase before accessing a victim’s mobile device 
 and intimate image folder. The offender’s activities may include 
 manipulating the victim into leaving  his/her mobile device unattended 
 and/or unlocked or monitoring the victim’s routine activities around their 
 mobile phone storage and digital hygiene (online safety practices or lack 
 thereof). 
 Covert Intimate Filming “Voyeurism”: This involves the preparation for 






 assessing if the victim is comfortable enough to engage in webcam sexual 
 activity or is preparing to undress in the bathroom or bedroom.  
 4. Instrumental initiation (continuation) 
 Threats and Dissemination of victim’s intimate images: The offender 
 proceeds to access the victim’s intimate images stored in victim’s mobile 
 phone device. 
 Unauthorised Access of Victim’s Mobile Device and Dissemination: The 
 offender proceeds to the physical setting where the victim is most likely to 
 have left his/her mobile phone unattended/ unlocked.  
 Covert Intimate Filming “Voyeurism”: If the victim is present in the 
 bathroom or bedroom, the offender would plan where and how to best 
 capture the victim in nude and/or sexual positions without the victim 
 knowing. Although no court transcripts evidenced the installation of 
 camera devices in the bedroom or bathroom, this possibility was included 
 in addition to covert filming via the offender’s smartphone.  
 5. Instrumental initiation (continuation) 
 Threats and Dissemination of victim’s intimate images: The offender 
 browses through his/her mobile phone device and selects images to be 
 disseminated, the target audience, texts accompanying the images (e.g., 
 derogatory and degrading texts, doxxing) and which online platforms to 
 use in the dissemination.   
 Unauthorised Access of Victim’s Mobile Device and Dissemination: The 
 offender waits for victim to abandon his/her mobile device. 
 Covert Intimate Filming “Voyeurism”: The offender installs cameras 





 mobile phone, snipping tool or webcam recording function on the 
 computer. 
 6. Instrumental actualisation 
 Threats and Dissemination of victim’s intimate images: The offender 
 resorts to blackmail or sextortion, threats and isolating the victim. 
 Unauthorised Access of Victim’s Mobile Device and Dissemination: The 
 offender accesses the victim’s mobile device and browses image folders 
 for intimate images. 
 Covert Intimate Filming “Voyeurism”: The offender turns on the 
 recording device, snipping tool function or webcam recording function 
 and ensures victim is nude/ semi-nude and/or engaging in sexual activity.  
 7. Completion  
 Threats and Dissemination of victim’s intimate images: The victim refuses 
 to yield, ignores, provokes or challenges offender. 
 Unauthorised Access of Victim’s Mobile Device and Dissemination: The 
 offender selects the victim’s intimate image(s) and logs into victim’s 
 social media account 
 Covert Intimate Filming “Voyeurism”: The victim is nude/ semi-nude 
 and/or is engaging in sexual activity and oblivious to being photographed 
 or filmed. 
 8. Outcomes 
 Threats and Dissemination of victim’s intimate images: This refers to the 
 amount of time the victim’s intimate images remain on the internet since 






 consuming and disseminating images or contacting victim for sexual 
 services) 
 Unauthorised Access of Victim’s Mobile Device and Dissemination: This 
 refers to the amount of time taken to access the intimate images, create 
 texts and disclose image to target audience, victim’s participation (i.e., 
 time away from their phone, leaving phone unlocked and social media 
 account automatically logged in) third parties reactions (e.g., 
 downloading, storing and consuming images, disseminating images or 
 contacting victim for sexual services). 
 Covert Intimate Filming “Voyeurism”: This refers to the duration of 
 nudity and/or  sexual activity while being photographed or filmed, the 
 victim’s participation (i.e., the victim being unaware that she/he is being 
 filmed) and the offender’s non-consensual creation of an intimate visual 
 recording(s) of the victim. 
 9. Post condition  
 Threats and Dissemination of victim’s intimate images: Avoiding 
 disclosure strategies are employed by the offender would be more 
 complex if the offender maintained “abusive” contact with the victim (i.e., 
 coercive control tactics and psychological harm through threats to 
 disseminate the victim’s private self-taken sexual images and sextortion). 
 Unauthorised Access of Victim’s Mobile Device and Dissemination: 
 Avoiding disclosure strategies would be less complex if the victim 







 Covert Intimate Filming “Voyeurism”: Avoiding disclosure strategies 
 would be less complex if the offender was not suspected by the victim or 
 if the offender stored these covert intimate visual recordings safely. 
 
Figure 1.2. Image-based sexual abuse crime script: Unauthorised Access of a victim’s 
mobile device (victim does not disclose images to offender) 






Figure 1.3. Intimate covert filming crime script: Covert Intimate Filming “Voyeurism” 
 (victim does not disclose images to offender) 







6.3. Applying ‘CRAVED’: Intimate Images as “Hot” Products 
 In Chapter 6, Clarke’s (1999) CRAVED framework described in the 
previous chapter can be readily applied to retribution-style IBSA. 
Concealable takes the form of the offender concealing his/her own identity and 
criminal behaviour. This means being aware of and exploiting the anonymity of 
the internet by setting up multiple “fake” accounts on multiple online platforms 
for a given period before closing them down or creating new accounts on other 
platforms, making it difficult to collect conclusive digital evidence on the origin 
of IBSA offences and remove “all content” from the internet. Only “known” 
content can be removed and depending where and how many images have been 
uploaded and circulated, there is a risk of the content re-surfacing on the internet 
at a later time. The offender can also pretend to delete all of the victim’s images in 
front of the victim when back-up copies have already been made and stored in 
his/her storage devices (e.g., a folder on the desktop, USB) or in the Cloud. It is 
easier to conceal the act of non-consensual dissemination as most bystanders 
would not be able to foresee and/or pre-empt this threat for the target. The targets 
themselves may not even be aware of their images being posted on the internet. If 
the offender has the resources to remain hidden on the internet (e.g., hiding IP 
addresses), this makes the origin of the crime and distributors of the content more 
concealable. 
Abuse anonymity of Internet and erasing forensic digital evidence  
Opportunities for IBSA perpetration: 
 1= no contact with victim (victim notified by someone other than 
 offender) 





 3= uploading images using an online privacy platform (concealing identity 
 and location) 
 4= relying on second and third degree perpetrators to circulate content 
 5= denying involvement in dissemination of victim’s intimate images 
Removable refers to the ease in which an offender is able to extract intimate 
images from the target. In the majority of retribution-style IBSA cases, the images 
were readily provided by the victim to the offender (e.g., sexual self-image taken 
and shared). Here, the offender “abuses” the safety of the intimate context by 
establishing a false sense of trust only to breach confidentiality afterwards through 
blackmail or the non-consensual dissemination of the victim’s intimate images. 
As opposed to the removal (i.e., stealing) of an item from a physical site, the 
removal in this context would be the removal of privacy rights and control the 
victim has over his/her own intimate images. This process of removal is 
completed once the potential offender is in possession of the victim’s intimate 
images. As the images are digitalised rather than in polaroid form, they are able to 
be transferred or transported from one device to another or from one device to 
multiple platforms with considerable ease and speed. Digitalised images are 
highly removable, downloadable and can be easily uploaded. Videos take longer 
to download and transfer and would be less removable than photographs. Videos 
also take up more storage space in an offender’s phone and uploads (if any) are 
more or less restricted to pornographic sites.  
On the other hand, removability decreases if the target is unwilling to provide 
their intimate images to the offender or if the target insists on their images being 
deleted from the offender’s mobile device/ computer. Evidently, removability is 





the offender or if the target has requested the deletion of all intimate images from 
the offender’s mobile device or Cloud Storage. In these situations, the potential 
offender may need to resort to other covert and/or overt strategies to preserve the 
images in his/her mobile device or extract intimate images from the target through 
webcam screenshots, covert intimate filming in the bedroom and bathroom or 
personally accessing the victim’s phone or computer for intimate images without 
permission. Pre-emptive personal online security measures (e.g., passwords and 2-
step authentication) taken by the target may considerably reduce the removability 
as well. It would also be more difficult for the offender to disseminate the victim’s 
intimate images to the victim’s family, friends on social media and employers if 
these groups of individuals and the victim do not have a social media account or 
an online presence which are rare in this digital age. If the target has a social 
media account with his/her friends and family and if the offender is “familiar” 
with the target’s social circles, removability increases significantly.  
Exploiting “intimacy” in an intimate relationship context 
Opportunities for IBSA perpetration: 
 1= non-consensual dissemination of consensually taken and shared 
 intimate images 
 2= unauthorised webcam screen captures during a shared sexual webcam 
 experience  
 3= covert intimate filming and photo taking  
 4= unauthorised access of a target’s smartphone containing intimate image 
 folders or email and accessing social media accounts 
 5= using previous intimate relationship history to extort unwanted sexual 





Available refers to the target’s visibility (attributes that expose a target to contact 
or an attack) and accessibility (the site and placement of the intimate images or 
human target that increase the risk of an attack). When applied to retribution-style 
IBSA perpetration, availability explains why former or current intimate partners 
are disproportionately represented in IBSA perpetration statistics. In an intimate 
relationship context, the offender and target spend time together (in-the-flesh and 
online) and there is ample time and opportunities for sexual self-taken images to 
be shared by the target with the potential offender. The target becomes more 
available if there is already a history of abusive or violent behaviours in the 
relationship, if the target (former dating partner) has moved on to date another 
individual or if there are signs of infidelity by the target (married but separated or 
cohabitating but separated). Hence, availability for an attack increases after a 
relationship breakdown and a pattern of abusive/ violent behaviours that can 
persist after separation. Unattended and unlocked mobile devices or image folders 
that are not saved in the target’s phone as private and encrypted with a secure 
password and social media and e-mail accounts that are not logged out of are 
highly available to an attack. Former or current partners are able to exploit “trust” 
in the intimate relationship space and gain access to a target’s intimate images via 
sexting, unauthorised access of a target’s personal mobile device and/or covert 
intimate filming. Potential offenders whose targets neither participated in sexting 
behaviours with them nor authorised the continued storage of their intimate 
images in the potential offender’s mobile device/ computer would be less 
available compared to targets who have shared their intimate images with the 
potential offender. Online platforms that advocate and promote retribution-style 





porn sites), online trading sites or social media sites without clear terms and 
conditions against the non-consensual dissemination of a target’s intimate images 
increase availability and offending. 
Locating a suitable target (Target Accessibility and Visibility Variables) 
Opportunities for IBSA perpetration: 
 1= target engaged in sexual self-image taking 
 2= target stores sexual self-images in smartphone 
 3= target engaged in sexting 
 4= target engaged in in-the-flesh sexual activities while being 
 consensually filmed  
 5= target engaged in sexual activities while being covertly filmed 
 6= target engaged in sexual activities via webcam while screen captures 
 were covertly made without consent 
 7= target shared passwords of social media accounts and e-mails 
 8= target leaves smartphones or personal computers unlocked and/or 
 unattended 
 9= relationship breakdown (dating separation) 
 10= suspected spousal infidelity (marital separation) 
 11= suspected spousal infidelity (marital conflict; no separation) 
Valuable is similar to Felson’s (1998) value where the target (or misuse of a 
target’s intimate images) satisfies non-monetary (e.g., power and control and 
relationship retribution) and/or monetary goals of the offender. In IBSA, the “hot” 
product is evidently the target’s semi-nude, nude or sexual images and are 
immediately construed as pornographic material meant for consumption 





pornography). If the images are that of a female, this feeds the culture of violence 
against women and offending may be perceived as a means to repair patriarchal 
damage and re-establish order. The potential offender considers the images 
valuable if they clearly identify the target and feature the target as fully nude 
and/or engaging in sexual activities. The potential offender can also increase the 
sexual value of the target’s images through doxxing- attaching the target’s 
personal details such as full name, contact details (e.g., mobile, e-mail addresses) 
along with the target’s intimate images. If the images featuring the target’s private 
areas are blurred out, lack identifying features (e.g., face, tattoos, scars) or are not 
skillfully sexually photoshopped, their value decreases and there would be less 
motivation to share them. 
Attaching context, meaning, personal information and/or price to a victim’s 
intimate images.  
Opportunities for IBSA perpetration: 
 1= doxxing  
 2= using texts indicative of sexual objectification, subjugation and 
 debasement 
 3= attaching a price tag to victim’s intimate images (advertising for sexual 
 services) 
Enjoyable refers to the offender reaping positive feelings from participating in 
offending behaviours. The enjoyment reaped from the non-consensual 
dissemination of a target’s intimate images also increases with the knowledge that 
the offender has complete control over the harm inflicted on the target with a click 
of a button. The level of enjoyment also increases if the offender has knowledge 





visitors and internet users who encounter the target’s intimate images by chance 
or deliberately, may download them and circulate the target’s images, further 
increasing the extensiveness of damage. This knowledge of the power and control 
an offender has over the target could justify atonement for previous relationship 
grievances. 
Sexual Gratification, Sexual Excitement, Sexual Aggression, Sexual Sadism, 
Sexual Debasement and Subjugation  
Opportunities for IBSA perpetration: 
 1= disseminating intimate images of victim to porn and trading sites 
 2= persisting in offending behaviours (e.g., persistent threats to 
 disseminate images, uploading new content when older ones get taken 
 down by site hosts) 
 3= setting up victim (former intimate partner) for sexual harassment, 
 stalking or sexual assault  
 4= coercing victim (former intimate partner) into performing unwanted 
 sexual acts (sextortion) 
 5= aligning oneself to other individuals who provide encouragement and 
 support for violence (see Collins, 2013) 
Disposable refers to the offender avoiding detection after the crime has been 
committed. Ways of disposing the evidence include personally removing original 
posts, deleting all of the victim’s intimate images from the personal storage 
devices, only sending the images (pictures and/or videos) to the victim to threaten 
the victim directly, frame the crime to resemble that of a hacker breaking into the 
victim’s phone/ computer and disseminating the images and avoiding 





may or may not remind the victim of the risks or harms involved in seeking help 
from the authorities. These harms include losing friends, strained parent-child 
relationships (e.g., a bad mother/ child), if non-heterosexual, the risk of being 
“outed” or not taken seriously if this is brought to the police and public’s attention 
and negative economic consequences (e.g., getting fired, losing financial 
independence or incurring heavy financial losses if the victim chooses to seek 
legal redress). Exploiting loopholes in the criminal justice system contributing to 
underreporting can also increase disposability of the victim. 
Deterring victim from help-seeking behaviours, reporting offending to 
authorities or being apprehended 
Opportunities for IBSA perpetration: 
 1= employing coercive tactics (e.g., delivering credible threats, shaming 
 victim  through dissemination of intimate images and harming victim 
 psychologically, socially, culturally, occupationally and financially) 
 2= employing control tactics (e.g., blaming abusive behaviour on mental 
 health  problems, attempting to reconcile with victim, preventing victim 
 from pursuing new relationships) 
 3= maintaining distance when uploading images strategically to various 
 platforms without a face-to-face confrontation with the target (see Collins, 
 2013) 
 4= adopting a covert tactical approach by feigning the absence of conflict 
 (concealing signs of disputatiousness or aggressiveness) (see Luckenbill & 
 Doyle, 1989) until enough forensic digital evidence has been gathered for 






Chapter 7. Prevention of Retribution-Style IBSA 
 This chapter outlines key themes and unexpected yet important findings 
targeted at improving current tactical, strategic and operational systems in areas of 
response, intervention and prevention. 
Results 
7.1. Thematic analysis of Interviews 
A. Nature of Images 
Most of the disseminated intimate images were self-taken sexual images by the 
victim and privately shared with the victim’s former intimate partner.  
 Mainly images more than videos but more commonly images. We do not get too much 
 stuff superimposed but we get cases that are tricky where the person’s head is not in the 
 shot but it is still their image. Proportionately, it is more images taken with consent but 
 not with consent to share. We definitely get covert snaps taking and covert filming and 
 things that people are not aware of but the majority would be taken with consent. 
 (Participant A) 
 
 If it is a relationship they have had for a while, we have seen some where it is obvious 
 that the perpetrator has taken the photos. Most of the time, the victim knows and is 
 consenting to it but there are a few cases we get in which where the victim does not know 
 and has not consented to them even taking the footage which ramps up the seriousness of 
 it. It would be more common that the victim has consented to providing the images. 
 (Participant D) 
 
B. Temporal Patterns of Reporting 
IBSA reporting peaks during certain times of the year, week and time of day.  
  We definitely have higher number of reports over the winter [July, August and 
 September] rather than the summer months, the key school holiday months of December 
 or January for all report types not just IBSA. For whatever reason, people reporting to us 
 these types of incidences [IBSA] tends to peak in the middle of the week, Wednesday, 
 Thursday. (Participant A) 
 
 We see a lot more incidents reported in the evenings of this nature. (Participant C) 
 
C.  Victimisation-Offending Temporal Gap 
Participants explained the time lag between IBSA victims finding out that their 






 There can be a time lag between something being shared if it has not gone directly to the 
 target before they are even aware of it. Even a time lag between them then deciding to 
 report it because it is a very big thing for something to report something like this, so there 
 could be a quite a significant time lag. (Participant A) 
 
 I’ve had ones where they have been pretty immediate. They’ve been alerted by a family 
 or friend or the actual perpetrator has made a threat and followed through with the threat 
 and it’s been pretty immediate within like a couple of days or a couple of hours. But I’ve 
 also had ones where content has been discovered two years on from its original posting so 
 that’s just stumbled on someone to either typing their name or it’s been indexed in 
 Google or when someone else has alerted them to it... It really depends on whether the 
 person offending discloses [their intention to offend or their offending behaviour] or not. 
 (Participant C) 
 
D. Spatial Patterns of Offending 
i. Similarities in Spatial Patterns of Offending 
One participant outlined the overlaps between offline (physical) and online 
(virtual) spaces of intimate partner abuse with the majority of criminal cases of 
IBSA occurring within the context of domestic breakdowns.  
 Most people of the older age groups [28 and above] have an offline relationship that 
 develops into an  online component. Where the relationship is both offline and online, 
 it’s common for the abuse to be occurring in both worlds. That’s why it can be hard to 
 totally resolve cases when we can only deal with the online bit...The legislation has been 
 used far more for domestic breakdown type cases and it’s not uncommon in domestic 
 breakdown cases that there can be images used inappropriately. [HDCA policy makers 
 and law enforcement] have been surprised that the criminal side of the cases has been 
 used more than they thought it would be for domestic partnership breakdowns. That 
 would back up the overall trend for what the legislation has been used for. (Participant A) 
 
The same participant highlighted the extensiveness of IBSA in it not being 
exclusive to teenagers or younger adults. Technical competence rather than age of 
the offender was identified as a more salient characteristic of offending. 
 [IBSA] is more prevalent amongst younger people which we categorise as 21 and under 
 but it is certainly not exclusive to them. It can come from anybody from any professional 
 background, any stage in their life in a variety of situations. We see enough of it across 
 all of the age groups. Probably not the upper age groups, 60s but certainly the highest 
 reporting age group [for domestic breakdown cases that are on the criminal path] is 26- 
 40. So it is not exclusively the domain of teens at all... In relationship breakdowns, things 
 can get nasty when there are custody battles over kids and the ability to use images like 
 that. Where those images go depends not so much on the relationship type or the age but 
 the technical competence of the person doing it, whether they know there is anything 






Other participants spoke about adult IBSA more generically. Relationship 
breakdowns were identified as a trigger for IBSA perpetration. 
 In terms of age, most commonly between 20 to 35 based on my experiences. We do get 
 older. These are heterosexual [male perpetrator and female victim dyad] most of the time. 
 We have seen ones who have been in relationships for 5 years, 10 years and they have 
 agreed to have photos taken and obviously you trust your partner. We have seen a few 
 where they only met online. There are a lot of sextortion cases. They have just met online 
 and they have shared nude content really quickly and the victims are males in most 
 cases... Usually separated or just broken up or sometimes extra-marital affairs. It is across 
 the board but it occurs often after break ups. (Participant D) 
 
              It’s often a break-up. We’ve had people going through family court and people who 
 aren’t. (Participant C) 
 
i. Differences in Spatial Patterns of Offending 
 
Adult male IBSA victims tend to report IBSA in the form of financial sextortion 
scams where they had engaged in casual sexual activity on webcam while being 
covertly recorded by someone overseas and later blackmailed. On the other hand, 
adult female victims tend to report IBSA perpetrated by former intimate partners.  
 It appears to me that men are very quick to get their clothes off and masturbate online if 
 someone is doing it at the other end of the webcam but that’s actually a scam so we 
 classify that differently because the purpose is to extort money... majority of females as 
 targets. We do get some males as targets. We do get a majority of males as producers and 
 we do get some females as producers. But adults can often be in long term committed 
 relationships where they’ve shared intimate photos and then it all goes wrong and those 
 are used against them. (Participant B) 
 
In rare circumstances, a woman would disseminate a man’s intimate images. 
 I can think of one but that’s because he shared an unsolicited dick pic with her and she 
 distributed it on-- out of [name of dating site deleted]. “I’m going to teach you a lesson 
 because I can ask for that”. One other case I’ve had was a masturbation video. More often 
 than not, 90% of the reports I deal with are not of this nature. (Participant C) 
 
The same participant explained a case of “unintentional” IBSA which has 
implications for interventions. 
 I have had image-based abuse with quite a serious one with a Fijian Indian young woman 
 but that was more the fact her ex-partner’s device had been taken into a repair shop and 
 subsequently, her images had been distributed and uploaded on [name of file sharing 
 platform deleted] and they weren’t actually able to be removed. They were distributed by 







E. Situational opportunities for IBSA  
One participant identified three types of online platforms with the weakest 
takedown success rates that are frequently utilised by IBSA perpetrators. 
 It’s so easy to cause so much harm. Because of the “ease”, it’s only click of a button 
 unlike if you try to harm someone face-to-face, [you probably have] a history of 
 violence... How [name of blog platform deleted] works is different to other platforms. On 
 [name of social media platform deleted], if you share an image, it’s all connected to the 
 original post. It might be re-shared a thousand times but as soon as you take down the 
 source, all the shares disappear. [Name of blog platform deleted] doesn’t work like 
 that so people re-share content and re-distribute it. There might not have been that many 
 images but it was harder to contain and obviously that repetition of that offending isn’t 
 necessarily from the perpetrator. That could be other people re-distributing it. Because of 
 the anonymity of the type of platform, it is so difficult to determine where the source is... 
 [There is] a public trading group where men traded images and women were categorised 
 by name. There could have been over 100 women, so many images and obviously of ex-
 partners but that was on [name of file sharing platform deleted]. Men had the account 
 password and could access it from anywhere. They’re those file sharing platforms 
 that they’re using. It’s the Cloud. The one that stands out for me was that the platform 
 didn’t see that as  a violation of their terms and never removed the content so 
 unfortunately, that was not resolved. For most platforms, nudity is prohibited or like if 
 it’s on a porn platform and obviously it’s for this, it’s  prohibited. It’s considered abuse. 
 (Participant C) 
 
F. Maximising Harm with IBSA 
A participant identified abusive behaviours that retribution-style IBSA 
perpetrators resort to using that inflict serious emotional distress on their victims. 
 If [offenders] want to maximise harm, they get the images in many places as possible, get 
 the images into hard to reach places. If they are clever, they know that [names of two 
 social media platforms deleted] are going to take it down so if they want to maximise 
 harm, they’d stick it in porn websites etc. If they want to maximise harm, they just keep 
 doing it so every time it gets taken down, it gets put back up again. They would share 
 images with as many people as possible and not just any people but people close to the 
 target. It’s to getting it to as many people as possible, putting it in places where it is hard 
 to get down and continually putting them back up. Those are the worst cases, when it 
 keeps going back up. Sharing personal details-- there are cases where people put 
 inappropriate things on [name of dating site deleted] or something and give contact 
 details of somebody else. You’re getting double the harm, basically. (Participant A) 
 
Another participant highlighted the similarities between abusive patterns in 








 It’s the violation of trust and consent with something that is so intimate. [Intimate images 
 are] something they’ve got over that person so they’re often used to coerce someone to 
 come back to a relationship. I can think of a couple of cases where there are children 
 involved but more of dating as opposed to a marriage. (Participant C) 
 
Another participant explained how IBSA is sexual abuse as degrading and 
derogatory texts are often attached to a woman’s intimate images, putting her 
well-being in danger.  
 To distress the victims most is sharing them with a wide circle of contacts, like friends, 
 like employer—we’ve had that. On some of those porn sites, we’ve had people who have 
 had a profile set up by the offender saying, “I did blowjobs for $20 so here’s my phone 
 number” so they’ve had people ringing them saying, “Want to hook up?”-- even on 
 dating sites, so that’s distressing so they keep getting these calls from people wanting sex. 
 That can be one area of distress. (Participant B) 
 
The same participant and another participant shared how the harm is not limited to 
the victim but extends to the wider family and community in certain cultures. 
When the offender uses culture to threaten a victim, this is a type of technology-
facilitated coercive control and if a victim’s images are disseminated to family 
members, this could be a form of family violence. 
 The other area is when that is shared amongst wider family and friends and it can be quite 
 disturbing culturally in that context. (Participant B) 
 
 Culturally, sometimes, when you share it with a victim’s family, that victim is going to 
 get in trouble with the family. The perpetrator knows that sometimes. (Participant D) 
 
 Where there has been something obscene written along side the image, some sort of 
 descriptor or identifying the person by their name and it would also say whom they are 
 sharing the content with. If it’s a targeted recipient as opposed to popping it on a platform 
 where anyone can see it. It’s probably the fact that they’ve actually gone through and 
 either identified the recipients’ loved ones and often I have seen that culturally, the threat 
 to share possibly, more like with the Indian community or where it is more collectivist or 
 family oriented so that’s going to cause more harm. There’s often that threat there, I’m 
 going to share that with your family. In some cultures, families may not be aware of the 
 relationship that they have had online. Probably more around being targeted at who is 
 going to see the content and making sure it’s people known to them as opposed to 
 everyone, also informing the person before they do it and who specifically they are going 
 to share it with. (Participant C) 
 
G. Loss of Control for IBSA Victims  





than abusive texts. 
 Harassment by text, often a lot of the initial stuff to gain control back can be taken by the 
 victim so they can take away any immediate risk. So they can block, change privacy and 
 security settings. It can resolve via that way. Often, it doesn’t. There needs to be further 
 action taken but I just wonder for the fact of that [images] are outside of their control. For 
 that, I perceive it as more harmful. For images, it is not aimed at the victim directly 
 whereas the other stuff is directly aimed at the victim. (Participant C) 
 
Another participant explained why “doxxing” elevates the severity of IBSA 
victimisation. 
 It is less harmful if they have not got their face in it but often their name will be attached 
 to the images somehow and they will be identifiable. The person knows it’s them anyway 
 which still makes it harmful. (Participant D) 
 
Another participant explained that the internet shortens the time and escalates 
violence and the irreparable damage associated with IBSA perpetration. 
 I think what makes it worse is that it can get out of control a lot quicker online than if you 
 physically see somebody. When it gets out of control online, it is difficult to get back 
 when it’s all online. I think things escalate quicker and deeper online. (Participant A) 
 
H. Signs of IBSA 
The participants provided mixed responses when asked if there were visible signs 
of IBSA.  
 [If there are] threats, a history of abuse in the relationship, the victim is suffering abuse 
 from this person anyway and feels they have no choice to share, there is probably 
 awareness on some level that they will be shared at some stage. Aside from that, I don’t 
 know if people can see it coming. (Participant D) 
 
 The threats or there could be abusive communication, not necessarily threats but it’s 
 going down that  way where there is some sort of volatile nature to it... Being aware of a 
 new relationship. When I’ve spoken to the perpetrator, they’re still grieving about the 
 relationship break up and the other person’s  moved on. (Participant C) 
 
I. Reporting and other help-seeking behaviours 
i. IBSA victims’ reactions and responses to victimisation 
The participants reflected on perceptions victims may have about how others 





reporting tools used by victims. Scams seem to be reported more openly than sext 
dissemination by former intimate partners. 
 Images would be quite shaming to them because other people would perceive that as dirty 
 and pornographic and so the external party’s lens on what the person did with and 
 without consent would be aimed to shame them... If you compare when people who have 
 been scammed, there seems to be a preference to call but when people have something 
 intimate like this, their initial contact tends to be through a web-form, electronically 
 rather than call us. (Participant A) 
 
Another participant relayed the shame victims experience when reporting and how 
attempts were made to soothe victims.  
 I’ve dealt with people who were talking to the other person and they’re threatening it and 
 they’re  talking over text and I’ve been talking to them on the phone. They’ve called like 
 panicking but generally we get reports online. It could be that people feel ashamed. We 
 have to try to make them feel as comfortable as possible... The reality is that once the 
 image is gone unfortunately and if they’ve had it happen, I just wonder how violating it 
 would be to have multiple people see that content, something  so personal... Often it’s 
 that the person that has disclosed that to us and have confided in and they really want you 
 to walk along beside them through the process of reporting. (Participant C) 
 
The participants shared the negative emotional responses and psychological state 
of female victims of IBSA. 
 They are horrified and distressed because they did not ever imagine at the time when they 
 were taken consensually, that this would ever happen. (Participant B) 
 
 Most of the time extremely distressed, extremely humiliated, guilty as well. Sometimes 
 suicidal...not wanting to go outside, that everyone’s going to look at me, that paranoia 
 state. (Participant D) 
 
 We’ve had people who... it’s triggered prior sexual abuse and re-traumatised them so 
 they’re more susceptible and possibly more at risk. [We have had people] wanting to end 
 their lives, [feeling] violated, exploited, incredibly distressed and overwhelmed. [One 
 case] was just so prolific and [the images] spread and [they had] all been indexed on 
 [search engine named deleted]. She was suicidal and had made attempts and it was 
 horrific. There was no resolution for her, so those ones stand out. (Participant C) 
  
ii. Cultural barriers to reporting 
When asked about the socio-cultural backgrounds of victims who report IBSA 
perpetrated by former intimate partners, certain racial groups were identified as 





 You might have people from particular ethnic backgrounds to not want to go through the 
 reporting... Culturally, making a report may not be their way of resolving the process. 
 (Participant A) 
 
 We see a lot of European, Indian, Filipino. This is all going on the victim. (Participant D) 
 
 Racial groups, we get reports from people with Indian background, we get Pakeha. Those 
 will be the two main groups that have reported to us, more Pakeha than anyone... I think 
 it probably is, given that a  lot of Pacific and other cultures have strong religious 
 restraints. So, that could be a factor where there is the possibility of shared nudes or semi-
 nudes coming to light within the family or wider culture. (Participant B) 
 
Social minorities may experience harm minimisation and less action taken when 
they report IBSA to the police. 
 So it was, “What? Don’t be ridiculous.” He got turned away twice [by the police] and that 
 was enough for him to be disillusioned with that. He felt that because he was a gay male 
 that he wasn’t taken as seriously than if he was a female that fit the typical female 
 possible victim. (Participant C) 
 
iii. Confusion over reporting 
One participant reflected on the confusion faced by IBSA victims in reporting.  
 They are probably confused. If it’s something where it is online, the police will more 
 likely than not tell them to come to us. Although having said that, there are a lot of 
 convictions on the criminal side so obviously the police are taking these and working on 
 these cases. There are a lot of referrals that come to us by the police. Other people may 
 come to us directly but a real mixture, probably almost like 50-50. (Participant A) 
 
 Sometimes a family member would call or put in a web form but that’s less often than the 
 victims themselves. They may be referred from the police. Sometimes, it’s another 
 agency.  Sometimes, it’s just because they know or they’ve looked up where they can 
 report. [Name of organisation deleted] and other Helplines that know that something 
 would be able to be done about that by contacting us. (Participant C) 
 
Another participant explained various reactions from bystanders who contemplate 
intervening on behalf of the victim but decide not to get involved when they 
realise they have to contact the victim directly and can only support the victim in 
reporting their victimisation. 
 We need the report from the target and they’ll be reluctant to inform the target so they’re 
 only ringing for advice about what we can do but we can’t take any action for the victim. 
 “You need to have a conversation.” “I don’t want to do that.” “What action have you 
 taken?” “Nothing.” They don’t want to intervene. It’s personal. It’s not anything to do 






 people and they haven’t even been aware of what [IBSA] even is. I don’t think it’s 
 prevalent enough for it to be upfront online. (Participant C) 
 
iv. Police response 
A participant highlighted the fear of being turned away, experienced by IBSA 
victims who approach the police for help. 
 [There is] fear of going to the police, and the police’s reaction might not be as favourable 
 towards  males. We have seen cases of image-based sexual abuse in which the police 
 don’t necessarily take as seriously as we think they should be. We do see that a little bit 
 but I think our relationship with the police is improving and also it’s probably improving 
 in terms of their knowledge cause it’s new legislation. I think that’s the issue there. 
 (Participant D) 
 
Other participants reported victim blaming and the provision of unhelpful harm 
minimisation advice by the police. 
 From the police. They often feel they’re at fault for sharing something. That’s really 
 common... It really depends on what station they get to unfortunately and what officer is 
 going to pursue the report  and if they have the technical know-how and expertise and 
 resources to pursue that. If they are turned away by the police, then they can’t pursue 
 criminal charges. It’s up to the police and under the civil harm, there is nothing punitive. 
 (Participant C) 
 
 Yes, a lot of that. We’ve had people come to us who have gone to police who have told 
 them to get off social media or that they were “stupid” to do that in the first place... The 
 police have prosecuted a lot of revenge porn type cases because it’s pretty obvious where 
 there was an intent to harm and it has harmed so they seem to go to court. (Participant B) 
 
v. Perceived lack of support or support services 
One participant identified that adults tend to help themselves through their own 
victimisation rather than seek help and acknowledged the need to improve 
collective support for IBSA victims. 
 With adults, sometimes they have spoken to a friend. You ask adults if they have got any 
 support? They often say, “No, I don’t want to talk to anyone about it. I don’t want anyone 
 to know.” But sometimes they have support... There are but there may be issues with 
 everyone collaborating to support that person. We have started a connection with 
 organisations like [names of organisations deleted] to better assist in these situations. 
 Collaboration with more agencies would help. (Participant D) 
 
Another participant outlined the possibility of IBSA victims’ lack of awareness of 





 I think possibly it could be that we are not reaching hard to reach demographics, or their 
 honesty in terms of their awareness of our services, or they could not have the means and 
 tools to access a service like us. (Participant A) 
 
Another participants highlighted that the governmental support may not be 
convincing enough for IBSA victims. 
 Often, what they’re wanting is those things to be removed and for the person to say 
 they’d stop but whether they’d do it or not long term, there isn’t a resolution because the 
 thought of the photos being in the hands of anyone can cause ongoing stress. Whatever 
 we’ve brokered, there’s no enforcement behind it. (Participant B) 
 
vi. Cannot afford civil redress 
A participant explained financial challenges encountered by IBSA victims seeking 
legal civil redress and IBSA victims whose cases have not been investigated by 
the police. 
 If it’s legal or they can’t afford or they don’t qualify for some sort of legal aid and that’s 
 from preparing their application to court, it’s a little bit complex. We can’t provide 
 assistance with that. It often falls over because they don’t want to invest in it. It’s too 
 pricey and they don’t qualify for legal aid. (Participant C) 
 
J. Technical and criminal sophistication of IBSA 
The participants reflected on the possibility of new emerging opportunities for 
offending, maximising harm for victims and concealing IBSA.  
 There’s some technology now that allows you to photoshop video so that you could put a 
 different person’s head on a pornographic video. It’s even more disturbing than a still, 
 than a photo. (Participant  B) 
 
 It’s only going to increase in terms of where they’ve been placed, where people recognise 
 where it’s a safe place to place the content, where it’s going to have the lasting damage or 
 they’re never going to release who uploaded this content here so possibly that could 
 become  more sophisticated. (Participant C) 
 
K. Takedown Confidence and Success 
One of the participants explained instances when takedowns are easier and 
expressed confidence in New Zealand’s criminal justice system in combatting 
IBSA. 
 The ideal scenario would be that the image is taken down from any platform that it is on 






 image, it can still go back up again. How many cases do we get that cast iron resolution? 
 Probably very very few. How many cases do we get where we get all the images down? 
 Quite a few. But it would depend just how far they have gone. If somebody wants to keep 
 putting them back up again, then it is very very hard. In simpler cases where the images 
 have gone on one or two platforms, and we want to get them removed from that platform, 
 very good success rate. When it has gone to multiple platforms and websites, lower 
 success rate. Actually getting assurance that that image or the source image is deleted, 
 very very hard... We’ve got a criminal side to legislation that the police can enforce. 
 We’ve got a non-criminal side for legislation which tries to get parties to do the right 
 thing which we can do. We’ve got courts to back it up. I think New Zealand is in a quite 
 strong position. (Participant A) 
 
Another participant shared that their takedown success tend to be better if IBSA 
perpetrators consented to negotiations. This could highlight an area for more 
police support. 
 The fact that we have gotten down all “known” content online. There is no “known” 
 content online and we have had consent—cause often we don’t get consent to reach out to 
 the perpetrator. (Participant C) 
 
L. Difficulties Containing the Spread of Damage  
The participants shared that there is always a possibility that the intimate images 
could resurface in future as the primary offender along with other individuals 
circulating the content could be discreetly storing and circulating the images. 
Others have expressed that it is impossible to provide victims with the assurance 
that their images have been completely removed or deleted from the internet. 
 [Name of social media platform deleted] might take it down from their site but you have 
 no idea where else that has been shared. So, there might be places you wouldn’t even 
 know of. There might be porn sites you might not even know of. Someone might have 
 taken screenshots and is keeping it on their phone. (Participant D) 
 
 You don’t know what you don’t know. I’ve had ones where you talk to the perpetrator 
 where they’d deny it and I’ve had about 3 or 4 where the men have run back, they’ve 
 thought about it... because we could never guarantee that we’d got all content down. It 
 was just so prolific and it spread and they’d all been indexed on [name of search engine 
 deleted]. You can never guarantee to someone that all content is removed or that the 








Another participant expressed that it is difficult to stop offenders in their tracks 
and that motivated offenders somehow will find their way around any legal 
system. 
 
 I think laws will never be able to do it all together similarly with social media platforms. 
 You can go Dark net, you can do these things that are just not in the control of any 
 particular platform. I think if friends and bystanders were challenging the producers of 
 these material, that would be one thing but if they’re friends of the victims, that’s not 
 going to stop the people who think it’s okay to do this... No matter what a person says 
 they’re doing or even if police say they have deleted them off their phone in front of us, 
 you can never know if someone who has shared them with one other person. I don’t think 
 we can ever say something is completely deleted from the internet. (Participant B) 
 
The same participant explained how indexing of images on the internet, lack of 
moral and social responsibility commitment from online platforms and limitations 
of cyber security/ technical measures make it difficult to protect IBSA victims 
from further harm. 
 The indexing on [name of search engine deleted] is still there so you can still have the 
 name [deleted] naked photos, [deleted] performs sex. Even though you click on them and 
 there is no content, the indexes are still there. It’s complicated because of the nature of 
 the internet. People maintain the roads but they are not responsible for bad drivers. That’s 
 the analogy that we hear from content hosts sometimes. Content hosts, to be fair, have 
 improved their reporting mechanisms and improved the way they handle things that are 
 reported to them. There are rogue sites out there, people motivated by greed and making 
 money by clicks who are not necessarily going to be moral and ethical about how they 
 run something. I don’t know that security can fix it or what technology can or cannot do. 
 Certainly there is the thing about having a photo marked so it cannot go up on the net 
 again but does that mean that it cannot go anywhere on the net? Or someone invent a way 
 to unmark it? Probably. They can hack into  any computer anywhere, they can probably 
 work their way around unmarking. (Participant B) 
 
Another participant emphasised poorest takedown success rates being in instances 
when the images have gone viral and online platforms are slow to act and/or are 
uncooperative. 
 The case of [a 10-year marriage ending in divorce] was horrific because her children 
 found that and there were 600 explicit images. The ex, father of their children... It was 
 horrific. The police looked at it and they decided not to pursue it through the court, to lay 
 criminal charges. They gave him a warning  because [name of blog site deleted] wouldn’t 
 engage with New Zealand law enforcement so they weren’t going to pursue the case. The 






 pillar anymore, it has become more difficult with reporting. They will eventually take it 
 down but they’d take a while. (Participant C) 
 
Another participant highlighted how indexing on the internet increases the social 
and occupational harms associated with IBSA victimisation. 
 Sometimes, it’s a one-off. Other times it’s very persistent. Somehow a victim’s name 
 [would be linked] to porn site URLs. So if you searched your name, you would find your 
 name on a particular porn site. You click it open, sometimes there may be content, 
 sometimes they are not of you. But just having your name there is quite harmful because 
 if you were looking for a job and someone Googled you, and all of that came up, that 
 would be harmful as well. Those are the ones we keep seeing that are persistent so you 
 might get some down but they would just keep putting them up. (Participant D) 
 
M. Resources and Accountability 
The participants provided their reflections about the effectiveness of current 
legislation, law enforcement efforts and resourcing unevenness, prioritisation and 
constraints. 
 Because there is no money in that and would rely more on the online content hosts doing 
 a huge amount of investment in that space. I would say realistically, online safety. 
 Politically, I just don’t imagine it going down that avenue so it would be online safety. 
 It’s such a tall ask for cyber security but there are way much more child exploitation 
 material that is huge but that is totally under-resourced anyway but I couldn’t imagine 
 this in itself be seen as a priority any time soon. (Participant C) 
 
Another participant commented on the challenges faced by the criminal justice 
system in staying ahead of IBSA offenders and disrupting their abusive actions. 
 The law is strong in New Zealand. [There are] cases going down the criminal path for 
 Section 22, and there are other criminal leaders that the police can use. The police are 
 using them. Can they use them more effectively? Probably. We certainly get people 
 reporting to us saying that the person at the police station said, “Why did you send the 
 image in the first place?” We’ve got the legislation. We’ve got the police force which is 
 getting to grips with it...“Why haven’t the police done XYZ?” There are so many 
 different crimes the police have to solve. We are very niche in one of them but they have 
 to cover everything. The complexity of everything that is happening in the criminal and 
 the civil harm that is online is hard for society to keep up with the limited funds it has got. 
 The online world is moving very quickly and unfortunately, institutions that put funding 
 and resources into places don’t move as quickly. As much as we’ve got governments to 
 regulate stuff and social media sites that can always make improvements to their trust and 
 safety policies and processes but ultimately the people responsible at the end of the day 






Another participant highlighted the need for online safety prevention of IBSA to 
be rolled out in schools. 
 Obviously education is a really big part of that. If the Ministry of Education were to put 
 things in the curriculum around online safety, that would be a good thing because it is not 
 compulsory in the curriculum here in New Zealand. (Participant B) 
 
Another participant expressed the urgent need for more action and fewer excuses 
when committing to protecting and supporting IBSA victims. 
 Absolutely the social media sites. Police, Ministry of Justice. Obviously the platforms but 
 there is only so much that they can do. There needs to be more accountability because 
 they obviously keep falling back on the fact that it is not in their jurisdiction. And we’re 
 such a small fry in New Zealand so we don’t have any weight to throw around. It needs to 
 be the offender, followed by the government and police. I see them as the same. We have 
 very little power with platforms without the government and police. When you’re hearing 
 people’s experiences all day, every day, it does bias you. It has had an impact of the 
 opinion that there needs to be more  action taken. It’s really upsetting for people. You can 
 hear that but I suppose if you’re removed because it’s not what you do day-in, day-out 




 The participants refuted the common misconception that IBSA only 
concerns teenagers or young adults who actively and recklessly engage in sexting 
and/or short-term casual relationships. The participants’ views based on victim 
reports aligned with previous literature reporting that adults in committed, 
romantic relationships are more likely to sext than those not in a relationship (see 
Develi & Weisskirch, 2013; Dir et al., 2013; Perkins et al., 2014; Samimi & 
Alderson, 2014; Powell et al., 2019). 
 A participant outlined the need for a shift in focus from the age of the 
offender to the technical competence of the individual (i.e. an offender’s 
understanding of how to maximise harm using technology, the internet and 
various internet spaces and conceal their crimes) to improve the understanding 





police must be equipped to detect technology-facilitated coercive control tactics 
employed by the abuser (see Dragiewicz et al., 2018) through the misuse of a 
victim’s intimate images aimed at satisfying a goal of exerting power and 
preventing abused partners from escaping further abuse in their estranged 
marriages and domestic partnerships (see Dutton & Goodman, 2005; Woodlock, 
2017; Rivera et al., 2013). For these retribution-style IBSA victims, the level of 
harm is significantly elevated (see Stark, 2012). 
 The participants’ records of IBSA victim reporting and inferences on 
IBSA offending and victimisation seasonal trends open avenues for further 
research inquiry. Although this study was not designed to examine links between 
thermal climate conditions and higher seasonal trends of IBSA offending and 
victimisation (see heat hypothesis; Allen, Anderson, & Bushman, 2018; 
Anderson, 1989; CLASH; Van Lange, Runderu, & Bushman, 2017), seasonal 
patterns of IBSA reporting have implications on routine activities theory.  
 Applying the logic of the theory, during the winter months, potential 
offenders could be spending more time indoors and hence be spending more time 
browsing intimate images of their current or former intimate partners on their 
smartphones, ruminating about prior relationship grievances, accessing 
pornographic sites and/or online platforms that encourage or provide opportunities 
for the non-consensual dissemination of a victim’s intimate images. A greater 
access of smartphones and increased internet activity during certain seasons could 
increase prompts, pressures, permission and provocations to perpetrate IBSA and 
other technology-facilitated intimate partner abuse (see Wortley, 2008). Adult 
routine activities such as their routine work schedules may also account for IBSA 





likely to be notified by bystanders who encountered their intimate images or the 
victim’s name indexed on a search engine and/or while accessing pornographic 
sites towards the end of a workday. 
 The routine activities theory is also significant in situations whereby third 
party offenders had gained access to a woman’s intimate images by accessing her 
former partner’s smartphone. The tendency to carelessly retain intimate images of 
a former intimate partner after a relationship breakdown does not only increase 
opportunities for IBSA to be perpetrated by the victim’s former intimate partner 
but also by others who covertly download and circulate the intimate images 
through the former partner’s smartphone. This has implications for situational 
crime prevention in protecting the victim against physical-level security threats 
otherwise known as target hardening (see SCP; Cornish and Clarke, 2003). 
 The participants also identified the gendered differences in IBSA reporting 
with women being more likely to report the non-consensual dissemination of their 
intimate images by former or current intimate partners whilst men being more 
likely to report financial sextortion scams perpetrated by strangers they met online 
and engaged in online sexual activity with. Inferences can be drawn from this 
difference in reporting such as more severe forms of IBSA (that are experienced 
by victims as “serious emotional distress”) are perpetrated by former and current 
intimate male partners against females (see Henry & Powell, 2015; Salter & 
Crofts, 2015; Cooper, 2016; Kamal & Newman, 2016), harms of IBSA 
victimisation being more pronounced for heterosexual women than heterosexual 
men (see Bates, 2017) leading to more reports by females and/or victims being 
held to heteronormative norms and standards which reflect on their reporting and 





al., 2011; Ruvalcaba & Eaton, 2019). Perhaps, more police attention directed at 
socio-cultural differences in IBSA reporting, offending and victimisation would 
improve police responses towards victims who have suffered “serious emotional 
distress” from their victimisation. 
 The victimisation-offending gap tends to vary considerably in IBSA. 
Victims may have the opportunity to seek help quickly if the offender threatens 
the victim and follows through with the threat with the victim’s knowledge. 
However, as the participants explicitly stated, not all offenders make online or 
offline contact with their victims prior to, during or after the non-consensual 
dissemination of a victim’s intimate images. Victims whose offenders disseminate 
their intimate images to their close family members and friends through 
messaging apps and platforms tend to be notified sooner than victims whose 
offenders disseminate their intimate images to a variety of audiences using a 
number of platforms and online spaces within platforms (e.g., blogs, file sharing 
platforms, trading groups, social media public and private groups).  
 The participants also commented on the lack of direct face-to-face contact 
and how violence escalates online a lot quicker than in real life with more 
extensive and irreparable damage which is consistent with Suler’s (2004) online 
disinhibition effect or asynchronicity which explains that delays in feedback in 
virtual environments may result in an acceleration and exacerbation of an 
individual’s neutral thoughts into deeper expressions of toxic disinhibition in the 
form of an ‘emotional hit and run’. In retribution-style IBSA, the offender could 
be putting it (the victim’s intimate images) out there (online) where it (a 
relationship grievance) can be left behind (online).  





IBSA suggest that although there are prior signs of intimate partner abuse 
(whether acknowledged by the victim or not), many IBSA victims experience the 
non-consensual dissemination of their intimate images as unprecedented and 
unanticipated. This lands support for the internet’s role in concealing an 
offender’s disputatiousness and aggressiveness even after a relationship 
breakdown (see Luckenbill & Doyle, 1989), facilitating an offender’s attempts to 
bypass emotional/ confrontational tension with the victim, and the perpetration of 
violence and abuse at a distance with greater ease (see Collins, 2008; 2013).  
 The participants expressed concern regarding support for victims who 
cannot afford civil redress, have reached the threshold for serious emotional 
distress under Section 22 yet have been turned away by the police on grounds that 
their case not being “criminal” enough. Another problem for victims is that online 
“threats” to disseminate their images alone may not provide sufficient grounds for 
immediate police investigation. In unfortunate circumstances, an offender may 
disseminate a victim’s intimate images once made aware of a victim’s intention to 
report or reporting of the matter to the police (see Henry et al., 2018). More 
effective prevention efforts and controls would protect these victims from 
repeated and persistent victimisation. 
 Participants outlined inconsistencies in police willingness and readiness in 
investigating IBSA based on their IBSA victim reports. This is more salient for 
adult victims attempting to gain access to the criminal justice system in the 
following instances: (i) IBSA offenders do not have a prior history of intimate 
partner violence or criminal convictions (e.g., breach of police bail or police 
protection orders, physical and/or sexual assault charges), (ii) police prioritisation 





possession of child pornographic material (see Powell & Henry, 2016), (iii) police 
orientation towards victim responsibility and victim blaming (e.g., an adult 
victim’s failure to take steps to minimise his/her own victimisation victim’s 
engagement in sexting) rather than the offender’s abusive behaviours (e.g., threats 
to disseminate and disseminating a victim’s intimate images, covert intimate 
filming and continuing to retain a victim’s intimate images against the victim’s 
requests to delete them) (see Venema, 2016; Sleath & Bull, 2012; Henry et al., 
2018), (iv) police lack of awareness of the “serious emotional distress” 
experienced by IBSA victims in addition to the cumulative harms inflicted on a 
victim whose intimate images have gone viral on the internet (see Bates, 2017; 
Stroud, 2014; Goldberg, 2014), in turn resorting to harm minimisation behaviours 
(e.g., providing unhelpful advice to prevent or reduce further IBSA victimisation) 
(see Bond & Tyrell, 2018; Henry et al., 2018), and (v) lack of police technical 
competencies and resources to initiate and follow through with investigations into 
all IBSA cases requiring criminal redress. Other participants acknowledged police 
efforts in cases that had reached the threshold of “serious emotional distress”—
typically observed in contexts of in-the-flesh dating and domestic violence (see 
Bluett-Boyd et al., 2013). 
 The following recommendations are proposed based on the interview 
findings: (i) more time and quality conscious streamlining of information and 
support services for victims of IBSA (see Salter & Crofts, 2015; McGlynn et el., 
2017), (ii) more allocation of police resources into IBSA prevention efforts, (iii) 
more resource allocation in police training to improve safe and effective police 
responses to IBSA victims regardless of whether the cases end in criminal courts 





The Right To be Forgotten, 2014) in the most extreme of IBSA cases where the 
images have gone viral and cannot be contained (the right to data protection and 
privacy and legitimate public interest in accessing information) and there are 
suicide attempts and significant long-term mental health impacts on the victim. 
These interview findings would help propose a situational crime prevention 
framework for IBSA perpetrated by former and current intimate partners. 
 
7.2. Situational Crime Prevention and Crime Intervention Points for 
Retribution-style IBSA  
Discussion 
 Crime script intervention points were constructed for each crime script 
stage (see Chiu & Leclerc, 2017) and the three elements (offender, place and 
victim) of Clarke and Eck’s (2005) problem triangle that must converge for 
criminal forms of IBSA to occur. According to Felson (2008), ensuring the 
presence of capable guardianship and place management are likely to reduce 
criminal opportunities. In this vein, several situational prevention strategies were  
proposed to increase offender handling, capable guardianship and place 
management to disrupt and prevent criminal forms of IBSA. The crime script 
intervention points are also based on the rational choice perspective (Clarke & 
Cornish, 1985) which posits that offenders exploit opportunities in their 
immediate (online and/or offline) environment(s) when the perceived benefits 
outweigh the costs (see Table in Appendix C). 
 As IBSA perpetration, a type of technology-facilitated sexual abuse occurs 






catered to both spaces, including a mix of prevention of cybercrime and in-the-
flesh sexual or domestic abuse. The most effective intervention points in the 
offender-victim prehistory stage appear to be for the guardian-target and handler-
offender rather than the manager-place. Taking into account the data generated 
from the interviews and court transcripts, the majority of IBSA criminal offences 
perpetrated by former or current intimate partners are based on intimate 
relationships that originated in the real world. On occasion, an adult couple would 
meet online and would nurture an intimate relationship online (due to 
geographical constraints) before meeting physically. At the offender-victim 
prehistory stage, there could be more education and awareness initiatives in areas 
of healthy relationship building and management, understanding the realities of 
intimate relationships (e.g., relationships can fail), post-relationship self-
management, signs of intimate partner abuse, online and offline consent and 
privacy in different relationship contexts and engaging in communication and 
negotiation of personal boundaries, harms perpetuated and amplified by the 
internet for IBSA victims, negative consequences for IBSA offending (e.g., 
criminal conviction) and promoting safe and effective bystander interventions and 
increased institutional and police support for whistleblowers (increasing presence 
of capable guardianship).  
 Drawing from Chiu and Leclerc’s (2017) study on sex offences 
perpetrated against women, recommendations have been provided (Appendix C). 
In the crime set up phase, specifically the setting and instrumental actualisation 
stages, many effective intervention points are present. As place managers, online 






their security and privacy features and settings for potential targets to utilise 
whilst intermediaries (if present) can increase their level of support for IBSA 
victims. The police can also adequately support the intermediary by intervening in 
cases where offenders are non-compliant and persistent in their offending. Social 
media platforms can also constantly prompt users to log out of their accounts 
when not in use. Increased public awareness of the harms inflicted by offenders 
on IBSA victims and support for more aggressive IBSA prevention efforts would 
improve the presence of capable guardianship (i.e., friends and family of the 
target including third parties). Capable guardians are less likely to resort to harm 
minimisation and victim blaming attitudes and would be more efficient and 
effective in supporting a potential IBSA victim. Capable guardians can be present 
in at-risk online platforms and maintain a strong online presence to deter 
offenders. The police can also more actively utilise digital and print media to deter 
potential offenders. These can reduce criminal opportunities for IBSA 
perpetration. 
 During the offender approach stage, smartphone, online platforms and 
information service providers could strengthen their general and security privacy 
settings and to bolster against personal online risk and physical-level security 
threats. These should be user-friendly and include compulsory security features to 
reduce the risk of victimisation (e.g., mandatory two-step authentication and  
logging out of social media and e-mail accounts). Smartphone providers can also 
enhance their intimate image protection systems by prompting targets to delete, 
securely store and exclude self-taken intimate images from cloud back-ups. 
Smartphone providers can also use algorithms to alert users that their self-taken 





intimate images would be wiped out from their smartphone in addition to the 
recipient’s smartphone according to the terms of the sender. Education initiatives  
on how third parties can detect commonly used coercive control strategies in 
IBSA (e.g., blackmail and threats) and build resilience against participating in the 
circulation of a victim’s images would also improve capable guardianship. The 
police also have a role in removing excuses for potential IBSA offenders and 
alerting the public to the risk of incarceration and enforcing basic physical-level 
security (e.g., not leaving smartphone unlocked and unattended and deleting all 
intimate images when disposing, repairing or trading-in smartphone) and the 
negative impacts of neglecting basic security. 
 At the continuation and interaction and crime completion stages, the aim 
of situational prevention strategies is targeted support for IBSA victims from 
intermediaries and online platforms in ensuring immediate action for takedown 
requests and takedown success. Capable guardians can also help support a victim 
in maintaining a positive online presence in the unfortunate circumstance that the 
intimate images are circulated widely on the internet. The criminal justice system 
also has a significant role to play in leading and supporting initiatives against 
intimate partner violence, technology-facilitated domestic and sexual violence and 
reducing harm minimisation and victim blaming attitudes in the public. Effective 
legislation of IBSA as a communications offence and domestic and/or sexual 
violence offence would improve support for victims seeking fair access to 
criminal justice. At this point, more clarity on what types of IBSA are deemed 
“criminal” rather than “civil” would ensure that police resources are channelled 
adequately towards supporting IBSA victims through reporting and where 





threshold of serious emotional distress and fulfil the criteria in Section 22 of the 
HDCA would benefit greatly from immediate police intervention (as opposed to  
being turned away and redirected to the intermediary) should these victims 
approach the police before the intermediary. Streamlining IBSA victim support 
information would assist with protecting IBSA victims from further harm and 
possibly re-victimisation. When IBSA victims are adequately supported, this 
could deter potential offenders. The police could also increase their investigative 
efforts in IBSA offences involving doxxing which expose an IBSA victim to 
further harm and risk of physical stalking, sexual harassment and sexual assault. 
Online platforms could continue to remind users to maximise use of their privacy 
and security settings and encourage online safety. 
 In the post-action and exit stages, the collaboration between 
intermediaries, online platforms and law enforcement must be robust. Guardians 
play a significant role in situational prevention by not circulating, storing or 
consuming the non-consensually disseminated intimate images or inadvertently 
contributing to further dissemination by third parties. Capable guardians are also 
individuals who are able to support the victim through reporting, filing takedown 
requests, maintaining a digital evidence folder in the event that their IBSA 
victimisation requires criminal investigation, counteracting the indexing on search 
engines and directing the victim to emotional support hotlines or mental health 
services if “serious emotional distress” was suffered. Finally, more targeted effort 
must be directed at minimising victim blaming. An attempt has been made to 
address prevention strategies for threats to disseminate a victim’s intimate images 
and the non-consensual dissemination of a victim’s intimate images in IBSA 





The situational crime prevention framework would better address all types of 
IBSA offending including the unauthorised access of a victim’s mobile device, 
covert filming (see Table 2). This situational crime prevention framework adapted 
from Cornish and Clarke (2003) allows for prevention of IBSA in both offline and 
online spaces. Several strategies were borrowed from the 20 situational prevention 
measures for cyber-criminality by Miró (2012) to adequately prevent IBSA which 














Increase the effort Increase the risks Reduce the rewards Reduce provocations Remove excuses 
 
Harden Targets:  
- Smartphone hidden camera 
detector 
- Educational campaigns on 
risky sexting and Red flags for 
IPV 
- Women’s online safety, legal 
and mental health support 
services 
- Cultural minorities’ online 
safety, legal and mental health 
support services  
- Insurance and legal 
protection (specialised service) 
for technology-facilitated 
sexual violence) 
- Not engaging in webcam 
sexual activity if the other 
party does not show  
- Frequently asking the other 
party to make specific gestures 
on webcam 
Extend guardianship: 
- Password and fingerprint-
locked smartphone (biometric 
identification and authentication) 
- Online and offline 
neighbourhood watch for 
misogynist groups  
- Reminding one another about 
digital hygiene and physical level 
security 
- Forum moderators 
- Echelon 
- ENFOPOL (not in NZ) 
- Carnivore and Dark Web 
systems 
Conceal Targets: 
- Not revealing passwords 
to significant others 
- Changing account 
passwords regularly and 
storing passwords in 
encrypted password 
storage folder 
- Using 2-factor 
authentication 
- Storing intimate images 
only in “hidden” 
password encrypted 
private image folders and 
create decoys 
- Locking doors during 
shower 
- Sleeping with private 
areas covered 
- Cover webcam with 
privacy shield 
- Shutting off visual 
stream on webcam 




- Negotiating terms 




intimate images in 
various online 




sexual activity (if 














- International legal 
harmonisation; “Netiquette” 
- Seamless coordination 
between domestic 
intermediary and law 
enforcement 
- EU’s “The Right to Be 
Forgotten” (worst case 
scenarios) 
- IBSA is a sexual offence 
and a communications 
offence 
Table 2. 25 Situational Crime Prevention Strategies for IBSA 
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Increase the effort	 Increase the risks	 Reduce the rewards	 Reduce provocations	 Remove excuses 
	
Control Access to Facilities: 
- All terms and conditions regarding 
the prohibition and legal 
consequences of non-consensually 
taken and uploaded intimate images 
must be read, understood and agreed 
upon by all digital platform and 
smartphone users 
- Smartphone providers investing in 
more innovative security features for 
“sexts” and “nude selfies” 
- Mandatory personal information 
required by site users (e.g., personal 




- Bystander intervention 
programmes 
- Utilise online privacy 




- Improve IP identification 
systems 
- Reconstruct architecture 
with defensive ends using 
machine learning and AI 
Remove Targets: 
- Deleting intimate 
images from potential 
target’s and offender’s 
smartphone devices and 
the Cloud 
- Not leaving 
smartphone unattended 
- Logging out of all e-
mails and social media 
accounts 









- Seeking legal 
advice 
- Seeking advice 
from the police 
Post instructions: 
- Online platforms (e.g., 
porn, trading and social 
networking sites, bogs, file 
sharing platforms, software 
telecommunications 
applications and encrypted 
messaging apps) should 
have clear terms and 
conditions against IBSA and 
display them clearly 
- Fines for IBSA 
	
Screen Exits: 
- Tracking IP address 
- AI and computer simulation models 
monitoring and collecting data on 
user activity 
Reduce Anonymity: 
- Ban and block VPN 
services and Tor, selling 
and promoting Tor 
- Identify IPs 
- Registration on web 
forums 
- User identification 
systems 
Identify Property: 
- Copywriting intimate 
images 
- Documenting digital 
evidence  
- Using AI to detect 
intimate images before 









- Raise consciousness about 
psychological, cultural, 
financial and occupational 
harms of IBSA  
- Raise consciousness about 
bystander support  
- Raise consciousness about 
privacy breaches and 
physical and online forms of 
sexual abuse 
 












- Encouraging counselling 
to facilitate healthy 
grieving post-break up, 
support services for alcohol 
problems 
- Flagging mechanisms on 
online platforms 
- A user-friendly system to 
report and request removal 
of illicit content 
- Automatic closure of 
accounts and ban of 
accounts using same IP 
address 
Utilise Place Managers: 
- Reward vigilance by content providers 
and hosts, file and image sharing 
platforms, dating apps 
Disrupt Markets: 
- Breaking up online male-
dominated misogynistic “hate” 
groups 
- Imposing hefty fines on any 
civilian that promotes IBSA 




- “Idiots seek 
revenge and 
resort to IBSA” 
- “If he forces a 










- Remind users 
of the 
consequences 
(fines) if found 
out to be 
participating in 
IBSA 
Control weapons/ tools: 
- Disabling smartphones 
that are stolen 
- Crunching down on 
revenge porn sites, social 
media and blogs promoting 
hate speech 
- Search engines removing 
URLs of revenge porn sites 
- Government regulation 
over pornography 
Strengthen formal surveillance: 
- Planting undercover officers in social 
media groups, trading platforms and sites 
- Routine checks with content hosts and 
providers about at-risk groups 
- Dark web surveillance and employing 
decoys by specialised intelligence team 
for cyber crime persecution 
- Algorithm/ AI, data mining techniques 
and linguistic software identifying male 
hate speech, doxxing, and high traffic 
content 
- Control networks through proxy 
Deny benefits: 
- Compensation to be paid by 
IBSA offender to content hosts 
and providers for defaming 
reputation  
- Compensation for defamation 
to be paid to victim 
- Downloading, storing, 
distributing and trading another 
individual’s intimate images 
without their consent is illegal 
and enforce persecution and 













consent is illegal 
Control drugs 
and alcohol: 
- Not engaging 




activity to detect 
signs of being 
covertly filmed 
Table 2 (continued) 
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 To increase the effort required for an offender to carry out IBSA, 
educational campaigns outlining the risks associated with adults engaging in 
sexting in casual sexual relationships and committed but abusive relationships, 
safety precautions prior to and while engaging in webcam sexual activity and 
online safety for women and socio-cultural minorities who might be at greater risk 
of victimisation and experience higher emotional costs from victimisation. To 
harden themselves against covert intimate filming, potential targets may scan 
locations where a reasonable level of privacy is expected (e.g., bedroom and 
bathroom) using hidden (spy) camera detectors made available through 
smartphone applications, free network scanners or sensors. Couples already in 
coercive controlling (abusive) relationships and individuals engaging in casual 
sexual activity in a physical settings and/or over the webcam may be at increased 
risk of being covertly filmed or photographed. The police can also educate the 
public on common hidden camera locations such as smoke detectors, alarm 
clocks, mirrors, books, pens and soft toys and emphasise preventive vigilance in 
the general public. Various online platforms and smartphone providers can work 
together to increase user accountability should they engage in unlawful practices 
(i.e., non-consensual dissemination of intimate images) and be more conscientious 
in maintaining their records of users’ particulars and IBSA behaviours perpetrated 
on their sites and agree to assist with criminal investigations should they be 
approached by the police. Support services for individuals grieving relationship 
separation and facing mental health issues can be put in place. Flagging 
mechanisms and a system for reporting and requesting the removal of illicit 
content on all social media, pornographic, file sharing and trading platforms 
should be in place including automatic closure of accounts using the same IP  
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address. Smartphone providers can also remind users to delete all their intimate 
images and provide guidance on how to disable their stolen phones with 
immediate effect. Lastly, the government can regulate access to pornography by 
blocking pornographic sites and banning access to revenge porn sites.  
 To increase the risks the offender must face in perpetrating IBSA, 
guardianship can be extended in the form of password and fingerprint-locked 
smartphones, bystander online and offline engagement in breaking up misogynist 
groups, instilling and reinforcing online safety and physical-level mobile and 
computer security and bystander intervention programmes. Forum moderators can 
be better invested in keeping their virtual spaces safe and digital spaces can be 
redesigned to integrate machine learning and Artificial Intelligence (AI) to detect 
and delete intimate images that have been uploaded online before anyone views 
them. Linguistic software and data mining techniques can also aid in formal 
surveillance to detect doxxing, male hate speech, threats to upload a victim’s 
intimate images, sexual harassment, cyberstalking and attempts to extort 
unwanted sexual favours from victims. Anonymity needs to be reduced to ensure 
that digital evidence can be traced back to the IBSA offender despite attempts to 
conceal unlawful activity. 
 To reduce the rewards or benefits of IBSA, potential targets can not 
disclose their smartphone, computer, social media and e-mail passwords even to 
their significant others. Using two-factor authentication to lock their smartphones 
would conceal targets and storing the images in password encrypted private 
folders would make accessing the victim’s intimate images more difficult. 
Locking doors during showers and sleeping with private areas covered, covering 
the webcam with a privacy shield and shutting off the visual stream on the  
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webcam software application when feeling threatened during webcam sexual 
activity, deleting intimate images from smartphone devices and cloud back-ups 
can reduce victimisation. Hefty fines can be imposed on individuals who promote 
IBSA and image download sites can be controlled such that no one is allowed to 
download, store and circulate non-consensual intimate images without paying 
legal compensation to the state, the online platform and the IBSA victim. This 
would deter second degree perpetrators (i.e., hackers and third parties who 
received the non-consensual intimate images directly from the IBSA perpetrator 
and circulated them) and third degree perpetrators (i.e., visitors on online 
platforms who are aware that the intimate images were non-consensually 
disseminated but used them for pleasure). 
 To reduce or avoid provocations that may incite IBSA offenders, it is 
important that couples discuss and reach a mutual agreement on the terms and 
conditions regarding sexting, storage, deletion and dissemination of intimate 
images in various contexts including relationship breakdowns and recordings of 
webcam sexual activity and doxxing. As an added assurance, this formal 
agreement must be documented. Potential targets can seek legal advice and police 
support early to minimise further harm to themselves or risk of provoking the 
offender further. Rapid action by intermediaries and online platforms in 
responding to takedown requests are also critical to discourage imitation and 
prevent irreparable damage to the victim. The police could also enforce that 
downloading and storing another individual’s intimate images without consent is 
illegal. 
 To remove excuses that offenders may use to rationalise their criminal 
actions, international legal harmonisation is critical as offenders of different  
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nationalities and online content hosts based abroad are not subject to domestic 
laws. This would apply in adult long distance relationships and casual sex and 
sexting encounters with foreigners. In cases of widespread indexing and spread of 
a victim’s intimate images, the state can intervene to get search engines to remove 
the images from their search results and get reputational management 
organisations to assist the victim with maintaining a positive online presence. 
Instructions can be made visible by all online platforms that allow the uploading 
of images. Fines for IBSA can also be imposed by websites and stated clearly in 
their terms and conditions. Not engaging in drugs and alcohol before online or 
physical sexual activity is critical in prevent accountability from being shifted 
from the offender to the victim. Potential targets being under the influence of 
alcohol and other substances that compromise alertness also negatively impact 
their ability to protect themselves against covert intimate filming and phototaking. 














Chapter 8. General Discussion and Conclusion 
 The study sought to examine retribution-style IBSA and construct crime 
scripts based on specific IBSA behaviours. The results from the primary data 
proved to be valuable in proposing IBSA prevention measures and provided 
compelling support for more police intervention in such cases including public 
outreach. 
 To demonstrate how IBSA perpetrated by current and former intimate 
partners is situated along the continuum of domestic and sexual violence, there are 
actual examples evidencing displacement of real domestic and sexual crimes into 
cyberspace. For example, to overcome police protection or restraining orders in 
the real world, the offender can initiate contact with the victim through harmful 
digital communications such as threats to disseminate a victim’s intimate images 
or proceed to disseminate a victim’s intimate images without warning.  
 Coercive controlling tactics (e.g., intimidation, fear and control) are also 
evidenced in marital separation or extramarital affairs whereby the retribution-
style IBSA offender covertly films the victim (former extramarital partner) and 
threatens to disseminate the intimate images of the victim (current spouse but 
separated) when suspected of infidelity. As identified in this research, certain 
cultural groups are at higher risk of emotional distress than others due to their 
cultural orientations. Sexual violence is evidenced through the soliciting of 
unwanted sexual favours by former intimate partners and/or forcing an unwanted 
sexual relationship with a victim. This type of IBSA perpetration is akin to 
acquaintance-perpetrated rape. Sexual abuse is also evidenced when the offender 




personal information and advertising her for sexual services which directly 
exposes her to stranger and acquaintance stalking, harassment and rape.  
 There are implications for IBSA offences whereby the parent or an adult 
in the extended family has disseminated the other parent’s intimate images to their 
child, indicating that IBSA may also be situated in family violence. In the IBSA 
prosecution case of a mother being victimised by her daughter’s partner after he 
sent her a video footage of her daughter engaging in sexual acts with a third party 
while being consensually filmed, the police recognised the cultural harm and 
psychological abuse behind the IBSA offender’s actions directed at the mother of 
the daughter’s abusive partner. This criminal case also highlights that IBSA 
offending and victimisation need not solely occur between intimate partners. 
However, it is challenging to gauge whether the police would have investigated 
the mother’s case if the offender did not have prior male-assaults-female 
convictions and other convictions.  
 A few limitations exist in this study. The use of court data may be 
susceptible to inaccuracies due to incorrect recording, lack of details or a 
prioritisation of certain areas of a crime (Porter, 2008). For instance, it was 
difficult to find meaningful trends for offending as some court transcripts were 
more detailed in documenting offending patterns than others. Future research 
could use police case files and offender interviews to address the gaps in IBSA 
offending literature which this study could not. The interview findings indicated 
that the majority of IBSA cases do not make it to civil or criminal court and that 
there is underreporting of IBSA. As this study relied on victim impact statements 
in the court transcripts and interviewees’ accounts of victim experiences rather 
than victim interviews, it was difficult to get a first hand and detailed  
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understanding of the specific problems IBSA victims face in contemplating 
whether to report their victimisation, whom to approach for help and their 
recommendations for prevention and protection for future IBSA adult victims. It 
is also difficult to conclude how or why some IBSA cases are successfully 
resolved by the couple whilst in other circumstances, the abuse persists in spite of 
warnings from the intermediary. More research needs to be conducted on the 
actual and perceived challenges for reporting IBSA victimisation in New Zealand.  
 Due to a lack of quantitative data on the types of IBSA perpetrated in New 
Zealand, this study may not be representative of all IBSA cases in New Zealand 
but it is a start. In light of sextortion scams being the most commonly reported 
IBSA victimisation for New Zealand men and retribution-style IBSA for New 
Zealand women, future research can explicitly measure and explain gendered 
differences across all types of IBSA. As identified by the research findings, 
reports for IBSA victimisation is evidently more prevalent in certain cultures than 
others (e.g., European and Indian community rather than Maori community). 
Future cross-cultural research can be conducted in IBSA offending and 
victimisation. The study’s insights on capable guardianship were limited to 
perspectives of the interviewees. Future research could investigate guardianship in 
greater scope and depth – comparing different levels of closeness between the 
bystander and victim/ perpetrator with their willingness to intervene and actual 
intervention (i.e., when the bystander (guardian) knows the victim, when the 
bystander does not know the victim/ perpetrator very well and/or the bystander 
does not know the victim/ perpetrator at all). There clearly needs to be more 




 The recommendations provided in this study counter anti-sexting literature 
in the effort to minimise victim blaming, increase offender accountability and 
highlight additional police support. As adult intimate relationships are central to 
this research, the recommendations are also pitched at young and mature adults 
rather than adolescents with the latter being more susceptible to online risk taking 
behaviours and therefore victimisation. It is also difficult to gauge the 
effectiveness of the HDCA in deterring IBSA offenders and minimising 
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Appendix B: Interview Questions 
 
A. Generic Cases of Image-based Sexual Abuse and Revenge Pornography  
(i) Profiling of Offenders, Victims and Bystanders  
1. Who are usually involved in cases of image-based abuse and revenge pornography (e.g, 
victims, offenders, bystanders and other parties--- age and age gaps, gender identity, sexual 
orientation, racial group, education level, employment status, mental and physical health status 
etc.,) 
 
(ii) Crime Opportunities and Situational Variables  
2. When do these unfortunate events typically happen (temporal patterns of offending and 
victimisation-- e.g., trends, seasons, time of day, repetition of offending, time lag between 
offender posting/ sharing images and victims finding out, time lag between victimisation and 
reporting etc.,)? 
3. Are these relationships generally abusive? 
4. How long does the abuse typically last since the onset of the relationships? Could you describe 
the abusive patterns? 
5. What type(s) of image-based sexual abuse are used (e.g., videos and/ or personal photos)? 
6. Are these images “usually” taken by the victim or by the perpetrator or without the victim’s 
consent? 
7. How do the victims typically find out about the posting and/or distribution of their images? 
8. How are these images posted/ shared (e.g., social media, pornographic (or revenge porn) 
websites, private message, Public or Private group--> most frequent mode used?)  
9. Which social media platform/ medium do you think is most vulnerable to image-based sexual 
abuse? 
10. Could you describe the steps taken and virtual spaces used by offenders to maximise harm? 
11. How do the victims feel and what are their thoughts when they find out? 
12. How do the victims react and how do they go about reporting it? 
13. What do you think are the factors that lead to offending and victimisation? (predisposing: 
genetics, life events, temperament?)  
14. What triggers the postings/ sharing? (precipitating: trigger/ stressful situation?)  
15. Is the abuse in real life and the image-based sexual abuse persistent and recurrent? 
(perpetuating: what made it continue?)  
16. How are these matters typically resolved? 
17. Are the victims (and their loved ones) usually satisfied with the outcome(s)?  
 
B. Specific Research Domains: 
(i) The continuum of intimate partner violence in real life and in cyber space  
1. Do you think intimate partner violence/ abuse is far worse in real life?  
2. To what extent (i.e., large or small extent) is the virtual environment to be blamed for the 
offending behaviour? (e.g., the anonymous nature of the internet, the click of a button, poor 
surveillance, cultural acceptance of pornographic material)?  
3. Do you think that anyone who resorts to revenge pornography has a history of interpersonal 
violence?  
4. Are drug and/or alcohol problems typically present in the abusive context?  
5. What are some real life intimate partner abusive behaviours that translate to an online platform 
(e.g., controlling, aggressive, violent behaviours etc.)?  
 
(ii) The concepts of anonymity, harm and victim blaming  
1. Do you think that revenge pornography is far more harmful than online harassment e.g., threats 
of physical or sexual violence or cyber monitoring to track a partner’s movements and activities? 
2. What makes a partner/ ex-partner use images instead of text as a medium of abuse? 
3. Do you think there is normalisation of access to and use of pornography in New Zealand? 
4. What makes a suitable target for image-based sexual abuse (i.e., revenge pornography)? 
5. Have you experienced cases of victim blaming (i.e., Why do people blame the victim?)? 
6. In your opinion, do adults from Rainbow communities experience more victim blaming than 
heterosexual victims? 
7. Do you think Maori experience harm differently or more severely compared to Pakeha victims? 
8. Do you think there are sufficient support services for heterosexual victims and victims in 
Rainbow communities of all racial groups (especially Maori and Pacific Peoples) in New Zealand? 
9. Do you think deeply ingrained “institutional distrust” could be the cause of underreporting of 
	 164 
image-based sexual abuse by victims in Rainbow communities in New Zealand? 
10. Is more harm inflicted if the victim is recognisable/ identifiable?  
 
(iii) The gendered nature of image-based sexual abuse  
1. Do you think victims from Rainbow communities (compared to heterosexual victims) 
experience the impacts of image-based sexual abuse differently? 
2. What are your experiences about female-to-female revenge pornography cases (e.g., extra-
marital affairs)?  
3. Do you think harm experienced by victims in Rainbow communities is downplayed or 
overlooked in New Zealand? 
4. Do you think that the harm experienced by female victims regardless of their sexual orientation 
or gender identity is more severe compared to that experienced by males?  
5. Why do you think younger females are usually targeted? 
6. Why do you think most of the convicted offenders for Harmful Digital Communications 
Offences are mature European males and not of another demographic group?  
 
(iv) Possible ways to deter offenders-- Prevention  
1. What is it about the virtual space that facilitates image-based sexual abuse perpetration and 
victimisation (e.g., place managers, offender handlers, capable guardians) ---> victim-offender 
interactions in place and time  
2. What do you think would make it more difficult for offenders to plan and commit image-based 
sexual abuse? (disrupting motivation, offender decision making and behaviour) --> increasing 
effort, increasing risks, reducing rewards  
3. Should the approach towards crime prevention for image-based sexual abuse be hard or soft? 
4. Should law enforcement focus on organising people (online watch group) or changing the 
physical environment through online security features (virtual space?)— e.g., place managers, 
formal surveillance, increase visibility, assist with natural surveillance, extend guardianship?  
5. What are your thoughts about the effectiveness of the Harmful Digital Communications Act 
(HDCA, 2015) and do you think there is enough public awareness about the HDCA in New 
Zealand? 
6. Do you think the HDCA is a step in the right direction by the Ministry of Justice in ensuring 
online safety?  
7. Are you generally satisfied with the efforts and synergy of the organisations in New Zealand 
(that specialise in reducing image-based sexual abuse and providing victim support? 
8. Who do you think should be most responsible for image-based sexual abuse (e.g., victims, 
offenders, bystanders/ witnesses, family and extended networks, friends and peers, owners and 
moderators of social networking and dating sites, computer scientists/ cyber professionals, the NZ 
Government/ Ministry of Justice, NZ Police or the Media)? 
9. Could more be done in New Zealand to prevent image-based sexual abuse (i.e., posting and 
circulation of images)?  
 
(v) How bystanders can intervene safely and effectively in image-based cyber abuse -- 
Intervention  
1. Do you think bystanders play an important role in reducing the motivation of offenders in 
posting and/ or distributing images of victims (i.e., revenge pornography)? 
2. Do you think bystanders (real life and/ or online) know how to intervene in general? 
3. Should a bystander intervene or not when he/she encounters images of the victim?  
4. How should a bystander intervene to minimise harm on the victim? 
5. How should a bystander intervene to minimise harm on himself/ herself? 
6. Are there any instances or situations when/ where it would be best for bystanders in real life 
and/or cyberspace not to intervene? 
7. What would you advise the public to look out for when identifying signs of revenge 
pornography before the image posting/ sharing occurs in cyber space?  














 - Establish clear boundaries 
- General education regarding IBSA and potentially 
risky circumstances (i.e., reputational damage, 
psychological and physical harm) 
Partners: 
- Understanding both partners’ attitudes and 
perceptions about IBSA will bring more awareness 
in the event of any ‘triggers’ (e.g., break-ups, fights, 
saying “No”), online and physical privacy and 
respect for consent 
- Be aware that changes in the relationship (e.g., 
rejection, break-ups) may influence partners’ 
actions and potentially alter dynamics and safety 
around them 
- Be aware that gateway offences to IBSA (e.g., 
intimate covert filming and blackmail) are more 
latent 
- Be aware that offending does not always occur 
immediately after a break-up  
- Be aware that repeat victimisation and offending 
occurs more easily on the internet (i.e., images 
disclosed on the internet could resurface in future) 
 
- Public awareness of IBSA (issues 
around online and offline privacy, 
consent, intentional non-consent and 
potential contexts: e.g., break-ups, 
refusal to get back together, infidelity, 
new partner) (Barmore, 2015; Gissell, 
2015; Salter & Crofts, 2015) 
Partners: 
- Pre-establish boundaries, discuss 
boundaries, discuss concepts regarding 
IBSA perceptions, definitions, 
acceptable and non-acceptable 
behaviours, possible scenarios relating 
to consent and respect for online and 




































Script Stage Manager-Place Guardian-Target Handler-Offender 
2. Setting 
offline and online 
- Social media sites testing tools to 
help people manage how they 
interact with former partners on 
social media after a relationship  
- Online platforms and 
intermediaries specialising in 
providing practical support to IBSA 
victims  
- Online platforms increasing 
technical controls against potential 
IBSA 
 
- Monitor offline and cyberstalking 
behaviours, verbal abuse on social 
media 
- Check on female (e.g., “How is ex 
responding to new male friend?”, 
signs of blackmail (e.g., abuser 
demanding sexual favours in 
exchange of non-disclosure) and 
other coercive control techniques 
(e.g., cutting off social support or 
financial support for child) 
- If non-heterosexual male or 
cultural minority, check for signs of 
blackmail, verbal threats (e.g., 
threats to “out” victim or inform 
victim that law enforcement/ 
intermediaries would not help them 
due to their gender/ sexual/ cultural 
orientation) 
 
- Presence of friends/ family 
can act as handlers 
- Law enforcement’s online 
and offline presence and 
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- Have guardians present in 
location on at risk sites (social 
media) and maintain a strong 
online presence 
- Prompts to log out of social 
media when not in use 
 
- If in direct contact with abuser, do not 
provide positive reinforcement and 
discourage IBSA 
Alert victim immediately of the risk 
- If there is a high risk of disclosure, 
support victim to contact intermediary 
for additional advice and practical 
support for “potential” takedown 
requests and future actions. 
- If aware of the content of the images 
and the platforms that will be used in 
the disclosure, support the victim in 
reporting this possibility to the 
respective platforms 
 
- Increase public awareness in 
terms of guardianship and the 
role and practices required by 
encouraging young people to 
actively look out for each 
other and identify 
circumstances in which men 
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- Having general security 
and privacy settings in 
place 
- Having reporting and 
flagging of images 
protocols in place 
- Information Service 




standards to deter 
“anonymous” IBSA 
using the same tools and 
collaborative techniques 
they are utilising to fight 
terrorism 
 
- Education regarding common coercive control 
strategies (e.g., blackmail and threats) and ways to 
respond safely and effectively 
- Education and encouragement against peer 
pressure and to develop resilience  
- Education on online and physical safety --- fully 
utilising general security and privacy settings on 
mobile devices and mobile apps to protect against 
physical level threats (Imgraben, Engelbrecht, & 
Choo, 2014) (e.g., two-step authentication to 
access phone, logging out of social media apps 
and e-mail accounts when not in use, storing 
intimate images in ”hard-to-reach” folders that are 
encrypted with strong passwords, not disclosing 
passwords to partners, disabling automatic 
password saving functions and location settings, 
not allowing anyone to physically handle or use 
your mobile device without your supervision, if 
you have intimate images, never capture 
identifying features/ backgrounds- face, tattoos 
etc.) being careful to delete all intimate images 
(including Cloud back ups) when sending phones 
for repair, trading-ins or disposing of them 
- How to report and flag images 
 
- Remove excuses- general 
education on severe “privacy” 
and “trust” violations in relation 
to intimate partner violence and 
IBSA (e.g., “not knowing it is 
abuse” or “just for fun”) (Albury 
& Crawford, 2012; Powell, 
2010; Salter & Crofts, 2015) 
- International legal 
harmonisation (e.g., the 
criminalising of IBSA and EU’s 
‘The Right to Be Forgotten’) 
Intermediaries maintaining close 
ties with online platforms 
- Law enforcement alerting 
public that there are convictions 
















Script Stage Manager-Place Guardian-Target Handler-Offender 
5. Continuation - Domestic intermediaries’ and 
information service providers 
ability to take immediate action 
on takedown requests and 
combat IBSA 
 
- Support victim in maintaining 
a positive online presence 
 
- Remove excuses- widespread messages 
against intimate partner violence and family 
violence and offences through digital 
communications technologies  
- “IBSA is committed by those who have 
complete disregard for “consent” and online 
and offline “privacy”  
- “IBSA is a domestic (sexual) violence 
offence and a communications offence 
-   Alerting the public to the potential 
criminal consequences of “doxxing” (online 
disclosure of a victim’s personal details such 
as the victim’s full name, e-mail address, 
residential address, designation and place of 
employment or mobile number multiplies 
“risk” to a victim’s personal and online 
safety (i.e., possible identity theft, in-the-
flesh and online stalking and harassment) 
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Script Stage Manager-Place Guardian-Target Handler-Offender 
6. Interaction and 
Crime Completion 
- Online platforms to regularly prompt 
users to maximise use of security and 
privacy settings 
- Have effective avenues for IBSA 
victims to report their victimisation 
and flag new intimate images that 
surface or resurface 
- Support victim with personal 
online safety strategies (e.g., disable 
settings for location and friends 
tagging you in photos and checking 
you into places, control visibility) 
- Support victim with information 
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Script Stage Manager-Place Guardian-Target Handler-Offender 





- Do not download, consume for personal pleasure or 
distribute intimate images of victim 
- Do not inform anyone else where to find the images and 
the contents of the images 
- If others have encountered and threaten to circulate the 
victim’s images, inform them that they might be interfering 
with police investigations and risk incriminating themselves 
in the process 
- Support victim with creating a digital evidence folder 
(documenting dates for online disclosure and victim finding 
out, URLs, screen names and usernames, taking screenshots 
and downloading copies of images from website, reporting 
abuse to the online platforms and flagging abusive content) 
- Supporting the victim with monitoring new content 
through Google reverse image searches for image file 
names, victim’s phone number, name or other words or 
usernames associated with victim’s images 
- Supporting victim with setting up a Google Alert to notify 
victim of new content about victim that needs to be 
removed 
 
- Education regarding 
victim blaming, slut 
shaming by law 
enforcement and 
intermediaries: “Sexting 
is a safety issue and not a 
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Script Stage Manager-Place Guardian-Target Handler-Offender 
8. Exit - Keep digital evidence 
intact 
- Monitor repeat offending 
on same account or new 




- Encourage victim not to delete personal social 
media account (doing so would make it harder 
to push negative content off top search pages of 
internet search engines) 
- Assist victim with creating new positive 
content on highly indexed pages  
- Establishing emotional support hotlines for 
victims 
- Education for friends and family regarding 
victim support 
- Encourage reporting 
- Continue to support victim in maintaining a 
positive online presence 
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